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Brenda Patterson is a woman of color. She worked for McLean
Credit Union as a fie clerk and teller from 1972 until she was fired in
1982. Brenda Patterson sued McLean for racial discrimination based on
its conduct towards her while she was an employee. She testified at trial
that her employer and its supervisors gave her more demeaning work
than similarly situated white employees, passed over her for promotions
given less qualified white employees and did not even inform her of pro-
motion opportunities, denied wage increases routinely given other
employees, and subjected her to gratuitous racial slurs, such as the opin-
ion that "blacks are known to work slower than whites by nature."1
Section 1981 of title 42 provides that all persons "shall have the
same right.., to make and enforce contracts.., as is enjoyed by white
citizens."' 2 Brenda Patterson's claim asserted that the racial harassment
she experienced while a McLean Credit Union employee violated her
right "to make and enforce contracts," in this case, her employment con-
tract. The district court refused to submit her claim to the jury on the
ground that racial harassment relating to conditions of employment is
not actionable under section 1981. On June 15, 1989, the United States
Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, agreed with that interpretation.
The Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 3 reasoned, in part, that
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M.A. 1974, Harvard University; J.D. 1978, Yale University. I am grateful to Ron Cass, Dan Farber,
Phil Frickey, and Dick Posner for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article, and to John
Ferejohn, Edward Schwartz, and Barry Weingast for informal conversations about the game theory
used in the Article. I presented a version of this Article at the Legislation Section of the 1991 annual
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools and received useful comments from the other
panelists and participants. Dean Judy Areen and Associate Dean Wendy Webster Williams of the
Georgetown University Law Center provided intellectual encouragement and financial support for
my work on this Article, for which I am grateful. I appreciate the research assistance provided by
Matt Bernstein and Ken Smurzynski.
1. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 213 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
3. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). The facts of Brenda Patterson's case are taken from the trial
transcript, summarized and quoted in id. at 212-15 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
HeinOnline  -- 79 Cal. L. Rev. 613 1991
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
interpreting section 1981 to cover claims of on-the-job racial harassment
would interfere with the operation of Congress' more recent regulation of
workplace discrimination in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4
Ironically, however, the Court was giving title VII a narrow con-
struction. On June 5 by a five-to-four vote, the Court in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio I held that in discriminatory impact cases under
title VII, the employee must prove not only a disparate impact, but also
that the employer has no reasonable business justification for its discrimi-
natory practices.6 On May 1, a Court divided on other issues indicated
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins' that employment decisions motivated in
part by prejudice do not violate title VII if the employer can show after
the fact that the same decision would have been made irrespective of the
intentional discrimination.8
Following the trend set by Price Waterhouse and Wards Cove, the
Court held in Martin v. Wilks 9 that white employees who were not par-
ties to the original litigation could nonetheless challenge court-approved
consent decrees providing for affirmative action to remedy past violations
of title VII and the fourteenth amendment. The Martin case was decided
by a five-to-four vote on June 12. That same day, a five-to-three majority
held, in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 10 that title VII's statute of limi-
tations for challenging seniority plans begins to run when the plan is
adopted, rather than when the plan is applied to an individual. 1 On
June 22, a five-to-two vote of the Court in Independent Federation of
Flight Attendants v. Zipes 2 held that title VII does not provide for the
statutory award of counsel fees against intervening defendants unless the
intervenors' action is frivolous.1
3
These six Supreme Court decisions of May and June 1989 triggered
a national political debate. Each decision created practical difficulties for
plaintiffs seeking relief for workplace discrimination under either title
VII or section 1981. As a group, the decisions appeared an effort by five
Justices ta to narrow the protections provided by federal law for work-
4. Id. at 180-81.
5. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
6. Id. at 659-60.
7. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
8. Id. at 244-45, 258.
9. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
10. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
11. Id. at 911.
12. 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
13. Id. at 761.
14. These five Justices form the core majority in most of these cases: Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. The exception is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989), for which Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justices White and O'Connor concurred in the
judgment; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy dissented.
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place discrimination. Civil rights groups in Washington, D.C., immedi-
ately started to devise legislation to overrule as many of the decisions as
possible. Legislation was introduced in February 1990 to overrule all six
decisions, as well as three earlier Supreme Court decisions that also
affected workplace discrimination lawsuits.15 Congress passed the legis-
lation, with amendments, in early October. The President vetoed the bill
on the grounds that it did more than just overrule the unpopular deci-
sions, and Congress was not able to override the veto. The debate contin-
ues. Similar legislation has been introduced in the 102nd Congress.16
The debate over the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 dramatizes
the centrality of statutes and their interpretation to the fiation's civil
rights 7 agenda. The debate also raises issues about the nature of statu-
tory interpretation and the role of Congress. What interests me about
the 1990 debate is the rhetoric about the dynamics of Court/Congress
interaction in the implementation of civil rights statutes. Consider this
representative passage that appeared during the House discussion:
One thing is true about our history, and that [is] there always has been an
ever-continuing struggle, a struggle for freedom and justice and equality.
... And by the 1960's we reached a consensus, a consensus that we
would move in a direction that would allow the doors to be opened and
allow remedies to be put in place and say that discrimination was wrong.
For 25 years that process worked. Then in 1988 and 1989 a series of
court decisions came about that changed that fundamental process and
those definitions. 18
Such rhetoric whiggishly oversimplifies the Court/Congress interaction
over civil rights.
Certainly the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 was unprecedented
in its sweeping reform of the civil rights agenda. The Act, however, did
not emerge out of thin air as a simple retort to Patterson and the other
decisions. Actually the Act was the culmination of a fifteen-year process
during which the political preferences of the Court and Congress have
diverged. As I argue in more detail in Part I, the "consensus" of the
15. The three cases were: Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987)
(limiting reimbursement by losing party of prevailing party's expert witness fees); Evans v. Jeff D.,
475 U.S. 717 (1986) (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 does not prohibit waiver of
attorney's fees in exchange for settlement of case on the merits); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478
U.S. 310 (1985) (title vII's allowance of reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing party does not
provide for recovery of interest from government).
16. See H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. Rac. H53 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991).
17. I am using the term "civil rights" in this Article to refer to measures attacking
discrimination. I do not limit the discussion to racial discrimination, and several of the issues
tracked in this Article relate to discrimination against women, the aged, and the handicapped. (I do
not address legislation and decisions dealing with other civil rights, such as freedom of speech and
association, criminal procedure rights, and various privacy protections.)
18. 136 CONG. REc. H6765 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Gray, D-Pa.).
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1960s was largely driven by the Court and the President. The consensus
was the coincidence of leftward movement on civil rights by a Brown-
inspired Warren Court, by a Presidency that came to pursue the Brown
revolution aggressively, and by a Congress slowly overcoming the long-
standing Southern obstruction of civil rights legislation. This consensus
began to break down in the 1970s. The Court and the Presidency moved
to the right while Congress and the relevant committees moved to the
left. Between 1976 and 1988, this divergence of opinion manifested itself
in a series of legislative overrides of Supreme Court decisions. At times,
the acrimony between the branches was just as intense as that in the 1990
debate.
The rhetoric quoted above also wrongly assumes a mechanical role
for the Court. The Congressman seems shocked that the Court
"changed that fundamental process" by which civil rights laws had been
enforced since the 1960s. Much of Congress' criticism of the 1989 deci-
sions accused the Court of ignoring the original legislative intent in title
VII. In my view, this criticism is off the mark. Statutory interpretation
is an inherently dynamic process: the text evolves as it is interpreted.
The Court's interpretation of our civil rights laws has been particularly
dynamic.19 Thus, Congress' objection should not be that the Court has
changed the statute, but that the Court has changed it in ways the cur-
rent legislative majorities do not like.
To be sure, traditional theory emphasizes a mechanical approach to
statutory interpretation under which the Court is nothing more than the
"honest agent" of Congress.20 However, the Constitution itself considers
the Court a co-equal branch of the national government. Indeed, at least
some of the original constitutional debates considered the Court a polit-
ical branch, whose statutory as well as constitutional interpretations
would serve as checks on the other branches.2 Part II of this Article
adopts that original constitutional perspective and develops a model of
the Court as a political actor in statutory interpretation. The model is
based upon a game played by the Court, Congress, and the President in
statutory implementation. Part II uses the game model as a way of
understanding the historical evolution of the Court/Congress/President
interaction for civil rights statutes from 1962 to 1990.
The model suggests that the Court's influence on policymaking was
19. This is the argument in Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479 (1987), and subsequent articles.
20. This theory, too, has been vigorously criticized. For a variety of perspectives on the honest
agent metaphor and its inability to constrain judicial discretion, see Eskridge, Spinning Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J. 319 (1989); Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78
GEo. L.J. 281 (1989); Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes
and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. R.s. L. REV. 179 (1986).
21. See, eg., THE FEDERALisr No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
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most significant at two points: at the period's beginning (1962-72), when
the Court was to the left of Congress and relevant committees, and at
the period's end (1981-90), when both the Court and the President were
significantly to the right of Congress and its committees. The model's
success in explaining the Court/Congress/President interaction reaffirms
the original constitutional understanding that the Court and the
President and the Congress (not Congress alone) would determine statu-
tory policy. The model also predicts that, given the likelihood that the
Court will remain to the right of Congress, the most important variable
for civil rights policy in the 1990s will be the President's agenda.
Part III explores some normative and doctrinal implications of these
game theoretic dynamics. In particular, Part III explores the model's
suggestion that the Court is a political actor implementing its own prefer-
ences about civil rights policy. This suggestion involves a rethinking of
what we mean by "judicial activism." The model suggests that the
Court tends to slight the preferences of enacting Congresses in favor of
the current Congress, which is a form of activism. I argue, further, that
the Rehnquist Court has been more activist than the Burger and Warren
Courts, for so far the Rehnquist Court, unlike the Burger and Warren
Courts, has also tended to slight current congressional preferences. This
activism has made Congress more willing to overrule the Court's inter-
pretations of civil rights statutes. An important question for the 1990s is
whether the Court will curtail its activism. If it does not, Congress might
reduce the Court's role in civil rights cases by imposing new procedural
requirements on the Court and by shifting interpretive power from the
Court to alternative fora.
I
A CONVENTIONAL POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE COURT/
CONGRESS/PRESIDENT INTERACTION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS ISSUES, 1962-90
Traditional interest group and institutional theories identify three
dynamic elements of the Court/Congress/President interaction in civil
rights statutes in the last thirty years. First is the changing nature of the
Democratic majority in Congress, from a majority whose leadership and
membership were sharply divided on civil rights issues, to a solidly lib-
eral majority on such issues. The second element is the development of a
strong, institutionalized civil rights lobby aligned with the members of
the relevant committees. The third is a shift of the Court's and the
President's preferences on civil rights issues, from the left of Congress to
the right of Congress.
In the 1960s, the Court and the Presidency pushed civil rights stat-
utes in a liberal direction. Congress generally went along with the
1991]
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judicial and presidential initiatives, and there was surprisingly little open
conflict between the Court and Congress. This changed in the mid-
1970s, however, as Congress moved to the left and the Court, less
sharply, to the right. Congress started to override some of the Court's
statutory civil rights decisions in the 1970s. Through the 1980s, when
the President was aligned with the Court, the Court has shifted dramati-
cally to the right, and there has been a fair amount of conflict between
Congress on one side, and the Court and President on the other.
A. Court/Congress/President Cooperation: 1962-72
In the 1950s, the federal government became cautiously interested in
creating a progressive national civil rights policy.22 Sporadically progres-
sive on civil rights issues, the Eisenhower administration created the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice; deployed armed
forces to enforce desegregation decrees in Little Rock, Arkansas;
appointed progressive, Brown-enforcing federal judges in the South; and
pressed for national civil rights legislation in 1957 and 1961. The legisla-
tion that emerged in those two years was watered down in the legislative
process because Southern Democratic opposition was strategically placed
(especially in the Senate) and because the administration and the
Democratic congressional leadership lacked the intense resolve needed to
pass legislation.
The Warren Court contributed little to the evolution of statutory
policy during this period. It was preoccupied with the frustrating school
desegregation battle, where it had only vague nineteenth-century statutes
and unhelpful precedents to interpret. Moreover, the Justices could not
agree on how activist the Court should be on civil rights.2 3
All three branches, but most notably the Presidency and the
Supreme Court, shifted to the left in the 1960s. By 1963, the Kennedy
administration had made enactment of a comprehensive civil rights stat-
ute a top priority. President Johnson pressed for major civil rights legis-
lation in every year of his administration.24 As for the legislative branch,
22. For a brief history of civil rights policy in this period, see H. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972, at 16-24 (1990). For
additional material on earlier developments during the Truman administration, see To SECURE
THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1947).
23. Chief Justice Warren (1953-69) and Justices Black (1937-71), Douglas (1939-75), and
Brennan (1956-90) were activist on civil rights issues in this period. Justices Frankfurter (1939-62),
Clark (1949-67), Harlan (1955-70), Whittaker (1957-62), and Stewart (1958-81) were less so. See
generally B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL
BIOGRAPHY 175-96, 204-17, 252 (1983) (Court polarized during 1956-58 between Frankfurter wing
and a Black-Brennan-Douglas-Warren wing, sarcastically dubbed "B.B.D. and W." by Frankfurter);
4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2023-31 (L. Levy, K. Karst & D. Mahoney
eds. 1986) (discussing the Warren Court).
24. Specifically, President Johnson carried forth President Kennedy's civil rights bill in 1963,
[Vol. 79:613
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the Democratic Party remained sharply split on civil rights issues
throughout the 1960s, though its congressional leadership was more lib-
eral than it had been in the 1950s.2 5 While the median Democrat in
Congress moved somewhat to the left on civil rights issues during this
period,26 opponents of civil rights legislation controlled some of the criti-
cal committees. On the Court, sentiments shifted dramatically to the
left after 1962, mainly due to changes in personnel.28 The retirement of
signing the landmark Civil Rights Act in 1964; in addition, he introduced and procured enactment
of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, introduced and pushed unsuccessfully for a second omnibus civil
rights statute in 1966 and 1967 (but was able to procure enactment of the Fair Housing Act in
1968--originally title IV of the 1966 and 1967 comprehensive bills), and introduced and procured
enactment of the Age Discrimination Act of 1967. See generally H. GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 125-
300.
25. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), 1961-73, was more liberal on civil rights
matters than Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-Tex.), 1955-61. See generally Davidson, Senate
Leade" Janitors for an Untidy Chamber?, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 225, 228-32 (L. Dodd & B.
Oppenheimer eds. 1985) (contrasting Johnson's and Mansfield's leadership styles); Stewart, Two
Strategies of Leadership: Johnson and Mansfield, in CONGRESSIONAL BEHAVIOR 61 (N. Polsby ed.
1971) (describing the strikingly different approaches that the two had to the job of Senate
Democratic majority leaders). Speaker of the House McCormack (D-Mass.), 1962-71, was more
liberal on civil rights matters than Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-Tex.), 1940-47, 1949-53, 1955-61. See
Peabody, Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives, in NEw
PERSPECrIVES ON THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 359, 388-89 (R. Peabody & N. Polsby eds.
1969). The Speaker in the 1960s also began to exercise greater power over the Rules Committee.
See, eg., N. MACNEIL, FORGE OF DEMOCRACY 412-47 (1963) (detailing the packing of the House
Rules Committee in 1961).
26. Taking into account voting on civil liberties issues generally, which would include first
amendment and not just civil rights/antidiscrimination protection, the Democratic record is more
stable. See Sinclair, Agenda, Policy, and Alignment Change From Coolidge to Reagan, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED, supra note 25, at 291, 301-04 (discussing Democratic and Republican voting
records on civil liberties from 1953 to 1968). For a discussion of the importance of the median
legislators, see infra note 197.
27. Representative Howard W. Smith (D-Va.) chaired the House Rules Committee until 1967,
succeeded by William Colmer (D-Miss.). Although the Southern Democrats did not hold a majority
on the Rules Committee, they were able to use the power of the chair and other senior members to
slow down or kill civil rights legislation throughout the 1950s and 1960s. See N. POLSBY,
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 149-52 (3d ed. 1976) (describing Smith's use of the powerful
Rules Committee to thwart civil rights legislation, and the Democratic caucus' attempt to make the
Rules Committee better reflect the will of the majority). Representative Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.)
chaired the House Judiciary Committee until 1973. Celler was strongly on the left in civil rights
matters, as was a solid majority of that committee throughout the 1960s. See C. WHALEN & B.
WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 29-
67 (1985) (Celler and the Judiciary Committee deliberations on the 1964 Act).
Senator James Eastland (D-Miss.) chaired the Senate Judiciary Committee from the 1950s until
1979, and through most of the 1960s about half of the committee (Southern Democrats Eastland,
McClellan, Ervin, and Smathers, plus conservative Republicans Dirksen, Hruska, and Thurmond)
was center-to-right on civil rights matters. Senator Lister Hill (D-Ala.) chaired the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare until 1969, but the composition of the committee was strongly to his left.
To see the membership of the House and Senate committees during this period, see the Congressional
Quarterly Almanac for each of the relevant years.
28. The key event was the retirement in 1962 of Justice Frankfurter, the leader of the Court's
cautious wing, and his replacement with Justice Arthur Goldberg (1962-65). Together with the
Warren Court's core of four civil rights activists (Justices Warren, Douglas, Black, and Brennan),
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Chief Justice Warren and resignation of Justice Fortas resulted in a right-
ward shift in 1969. Nevertheless, the Court in 1971 was still substan-
tially to the left of its position before 1962.
The national shift to the left was reflected in the significant,
Presidency-led enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,29 and the Court's lopsided votes upholding the con-
stitutionality of both statutes.30 At the same time, the Supreme Court
began interpreting Reconstruction era civil fights statutes dynamically to
expand civil rights protections without waiting for legislative updating.
In Louisiana v. United States,s" a unanimous Court interpreted the
Enforcement Act of 187032 in a consciously dynamic way to invalidate a
literacy test based upon its potential as well as its actual effect upon the
fundamental right to vote. 3  Civil fights leaders and the Johnson admin-
istration used Louisiana to prod Congress to expand statutory protection
by enacting the Voting Rights Act.34
In United States v. Guest, 3 1 the Court liberally interpreted another
post-Civil War statute to criminalize some private conspiracies to deprive
civil rights activists of their fourteenth amendment rights.3 6 The Court
Justice Goldberg gave the activist wing a working majority on most civil liberties issues. See B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 445-50; 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra
note 23, at 848-49. The working majority continued when Justice Goldberg retired and was replaced
with Justice Abe Fortas (1965-69), and the Court moved further to the left when Justice Thurgood
Marshall replaced Justice Clark in 1967. See 3 id. at 1209-11. Justice Black moved discernibly to
the right in the later 1960s, but after the appointment of Justice Marshall, Black's vote was not
necessary for the progressive working majority. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 23, at 629-79.
29. For accounts of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see H. GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 74-152; C.
WHALEN & B. WHALEN, supra note 27. For accounts of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see H.
GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 162-76; S. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH,
1944-1969, at 307-22 (1976). See generally A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? (1987).
30. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (9-0 vote); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (9-0 vote); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964) (9-0 vote).
31. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
32. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) (1988)).
33. This is not a test but a trap, sufficient to stop even the most brilliant man on his way to
the voting booth. The cherished right of people in a country like ours to vote cannot be
obliterated by the use of laws like this, which leave the voting fate of a citizen to the passing
whim or impulse of an individual registrar.
Louisiana, 380 U.S. at 153; cf. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)
(upholding a state literacy test against similar statutory and constitutional challenge, but suggesting
that Congress could constitutionally prohibit the practice through affirmative legislation).
34. See Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-18 (1965) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney
General of the United States) (asserting the constitutionality of the bill, and citing Louisiana in
support), 469-98 (discussing and inserting into the record Louisiana).
35. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
36. Id. at 754-56, 759 n.17; see also United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (extending
criminal liability for deprivation of civil rights to private parties in conspiracy with state officials).
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was closely divided on the statute's exact reach,37 but a majority called
upon Congress to expand the statute to reach a greater number of private
conspiracies.38 Title V of President Johnson's omnibus 1966 civil rights
bill followed the Court's suggestion precisely. 9 The House passed the
bill in 1966, but an incipient end-of-session Senate filibuster killed it. The
same bill was resubmitted in 1967.' The House passed the title V por-
tion in 1967, and in 1968 the House bill became the mechanism by which
most of the 1966 administration proposals, including the protection of
civil rights workers, were enacted into law.41
Although title VIII, which established rights to nondiscrimination
in housing, was the centerpiece of the'Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Court
dynamically interpreted a much earlier statute to afford victims of such
discrimination significantly greater protection. Within weeks of title
VIII's enactment, the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 42
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to provide parallel remedies.
Section 1982 of title 42, the current codification of part of the 1866 Act,
protects against racial discrimination in the sale, lease, or other convey-
ance of real or personal property. After making a detailed historical
interpretation of section 1982 in its original form as part of the 1866
Act,43 the Court held that the statute applied to more than state action:
It held the statute comprehended purely private discrimination as well.'
Following the lead of lower courts, the Supreme Court similarly
37. Guest, 383 U.S. at 782 n.6 (Brennan, J., joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. See id, at 782-83, 786; id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring) ("[Tihere now can be no doubt that
the specific language of [the Fourteenth Amendment] empowers the Congress to enact laws
punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with Fourteenth
Amendment rights.").
39. See H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); see also Civil Rights, 1966: Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1073 (1966) [hereinafter
Civil Rights, 1966 Hearings] (title V is "a responsible answer to the Guest case"); id. at 1129-69
(Guest opinions inserted into the hearings record), 1097-128 (also inserting language from the
opinions in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966)). Title V was written not only to codify and
expand upon Guest, but also to modify the interpretation of section 241 in United States v. Screws,
325 U.S. 91 (1945). See Civil Rights, 1966 Hearings, supra, at 1074.
40. See H.R. 5700, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 1026, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Soon
after its introduction, the omnibus bill was broken up into separate bills, each focusing on one of the
titles of the original bill. S. 1362 embodied title V, but it was never reported from committee. H.R.
2516 embodied title V and was passed by the House in 1967, with amendments and after the House
had passed an anti-riot bill.
41. See Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub.. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73.
42. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
43. See id. at 422-36. The dissenting opinion's arguments for a contrary interpretation found
much scholarly support. See, eg., C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888, at
1258 (1971); Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 89.
44. Jones, 392 U.S. at 437. One Justice found that current conditions alone required the
Court's expansive interpretation. See id. at 444-49 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing continuing
"badges of slavery").
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reinterpreted section 1981 (the 1866 protection against racial discrimina-
tion in the making of contracts) to apply to purely private conduct.45
The Supreme Court's dynamic interpretation of sections 1982 and 1981
effectively gave more liberal remedies for racial discrimination in housing
and workplace discrimination than those afforded by title VIII and title
VII, respectively.
Jones v. Mayer is one of the Warren Court's last statutory interpre-
tation decisions. Jones was the only Supreme Court civil rights decision
of this period to come close to a congressional override. Referring to the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 by name, Senator Hruska introduced an amend-
ment during debate on the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
197246 to make title VII and the Equal Pay Act the exclusive remedies
for workplace discrimination.47 The Hruska amendment would have
overruled Jones v. Mayer insofar as it interpreted that part of the 1866
Act which is codified in section 1981. The amendment was rejected by a
tie vote in the Senate,4" but a similar amendment was adopted on the
House floor.49 In conference, the House backed off from its earlier posi-
tion, and the final version of the 1972 Act had no exclusive remedy
provision.5
The progressive position of the late Warren Court and early Burger
Court carried over into a dynamic and liberal interpretation of the 1960s
civil rights statutes. The key development in this period was the Court's
policy shift from equality in opportunity (the focus of legislation in the
1960s) to equality of result (the practical focus of the legislation as imple-
mented by the executive and the judiciary). 1 In short, the Court deem-
phasized the original goal of creating a colorblind society where only
individual qualifications matter, and emphasized the new goal of creating
a society where group results matter and reference to race is appropriate
in decisionmaking (in order to advance the substantive goal). In one
case, Allen v. State Board of Elections, 2 the Court by a seven-to-two vote
interpreted the Voting Rights Act very liberally (and contrary to some
important legislative history)53 to invalidate even minor electoral changes
45. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (private schools); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (private employers); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation
Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (community swimming pool).
46. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
47. 118 CONG. REc. 3172-73 (1972).
48. Id. at 3373; see also id. at 3965 (lopsided vote on reconsideration).
49. See 117 CONG. REc. 31,973, 32,111 (1971) (House discussion of Erlenborn amendment
and its adoption).
50. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1972).
51. See generally H. GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 233-54 (early administrative shift to equal
results); id. at 366-92 (judicial shift); A. THERNSTROM, supra note 29 (similar shift for voting rights).
52. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
53. Compare id. at 564-69 (majority opinion's discussion of the legislative history) with id. at
[Vol. 79:613
HeinOnline  -- 79 Cal. L. Rev. 622 1991
CIVIL RIGHTS GAME
that potentially diluted the votes of blacks.5 4 In another case, a unani-
mous Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 55 interpreted title VII to pro-
hibit employment practices that unintentionally have a disparate impact
upon minorities.
Both decisions were dynamic interpretations of recently enacted
statutes, developed by the Court in cooperation with the executive's vig-
orous implementation. They were also probably much more progressive
than the view of a median Member of Congress. Yet when Congress
extended the Voting Rights Act in 1970,56 it made no effort to overrule
Allen. Moreover, the House committee report used the Supreme Court's
precedents to explain the statute's importance and operation.57 When
Congress amended title VII in 1972, both the House and Senate commit-
tee reports explicitly endorsed the Griggs decision and its equality-of-
result implications.5 8
B. Court/Congress Confrontations: 1972-86
Escalating conflict between the Court and Congress over the
nation's civil rights agenda marked the second decade of the modern
statutory civil rights era. The most important development during this
era was the gradual rightward drift of the Presidency and the Supreme
Court, relative to Congress. The Nixon and Carter administrations pro-
gressively interpreted and vigorously enforced existing civil rights laws,
albeit not as strongly as the Johnson administration. 9 The Reagan
administration, however, took a sharp turn to the right on most key
588-91 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing majority opinion's
discussion of legislative history).
54. Section 5 of the Act requires "preclearance" by the Attorney General of any changes in the
electoral systems of designated states whose prior systems had discriminated against black voters.
Allen found that the following changes, among others, were covered by section 5: (1) a change from
district to at-large voting for county officials; (2) a system change making a county official position
only appointive rather than elective or appointive; and (3) rules making it harder for an independent
candidate to get on the ballot. Id. at 550-51, 572.
55. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (proscribing employee tests not related to job performance).
56. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970).
57. H.R. REP. No. 397, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 4-8, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3277, 3278, 3280-84.
58. See H.R. REP. NO. 238, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 21-22 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2156-67; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971).
59. The Nixon and Carter administrations look alike, even though President Carter personally
was more committed to civil rights than was President Nixon. The key boosters of the progressive
agenda in both administrations were the Assistant Attorneys General for Civil Rights-Stanley
Pottinger (Nixon) and Drew Days (Carter). In both administrations, my impression is that the
Attorneys General-Mitchell, Kleindienst, Saxbe, and Levi (Nixon-Ford), and Bell and Civiletti
(Carter)-were not as committed as the Assistants were. See generally H. GRAHAM, supra note 22,
at 301-420 (information on the Nixon period); Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987)
(information on the Carter period).
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aspects of civil rights statutory interpretation. 6°
The Supreme Court's shift to the right was more gradual. It began
in 1972, when Justices Rehnquist and Powell first started to cast votes.61
Subsequent appointments in 1975, 1981, and 1986 moved the Court fur-
ther to the right.62 Although there was internal migration to the left by
individual Justices during this same period,63 by 1986 the Rehnquist
Court stood significantly to the right of the early Burger Court.
In contrast, congressional preferences were moving to the left after
1973. 61 By the 1970s, a reliable civil rights coalition emerged, consisting
of a rainbow of unions, black groups, women's groups, and other public
interest groups. The House Democratic leadership and the relevant com-
mittees agreed with the coalition's civil rights agenda.6" The story in the
Senate was more complicated, because from 1981 to 1987 it was con-
trolled by Republicans. Although the Republican leadership in the
Senate was not hostile to the civil rights coalition outright, it was never
as strongly nor consistently allied with the coalition as was the
Democratic leadership. The relevant Senate committees continued to
60. I believe this generalization applies particularly to President Reagan, Attorney General
Edwin Meese, and Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds. Cf. Days, The Courts'
Response to the Reagan Civil Rights Agenda, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1003 (1989) (noting judicial
resistance to Reagan's anti-affirmative action agenda); Days, Turning Back the Clock- The Reagan
Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309 (1984) ("[IThe Reagan
Administration has inadequately enforced and otherwise undermined, if not violated outright,
settled law in the field of civil rights.").
61. These two Justices were appointed to succeed Justices Harlan and Black, respectively, in
1971, but did not begin to vote in cases until 1972. One study has suggested that their pre-Court
preferences were very conservative and that their Court votes simply reflected that conservatism.
See Segal & Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL.
Sm. REV. 557, 560 table 1 (1989).
62. Id. at 559-60. The events were Justice Stevens' succession to Justice Douglas' seat (1975),
Justice O'Connor's succession to Justice Stewart's seat (1981), Chief Justice Rehnquist's succession
to Chief Justice Burger's seat (1986), and Justice Scalia's succession to Justice Rehnquist's seat
(1986).
63. The most dramatic movement was by Justice Blackmun, who moved from being a
"Minnesota Twin" of Chief Justice Burger, to become an ally of Justices Brennan and Marshall (the
remnants of the 1960s Warren Court). Also gravitating to the left were Justices Stevens and Powell.
On the other hand, Justice White gravitated to the right during the 1980s, as did Chief Justice
Burger (who is, however, harder to pin down because of his strategic voting).
64. See Sinclair, supra note 26, at 306-11 (big jump in "civil liberties" support scores from
1969-72 to 1973-76, 1977-80, and 1981-82).
65. Liberal Peter Rodino (D-N.J.) chaired the Judiciary Committee from 1973 to 1989, and
with him was a solid liberal majority through those years. Liberal Carl Perkins (D-Ky.) chaired the
Education and Labor Committee until 1985, when he was succeeded by the even more liberal
Augustus Hawkins (D-Cal.); both chairs have enjoyed solid liberal majorities (including Republican
votes) during these years. See the lists of Committee members and their ADA scores in M. BARONE,
G. UJIFUSA & D. MATTHEWS, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS [hereinafter THE
ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS] published for 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, and
1988. The Rules Committee, long controlled by Southern Democrats, fell under the control of the
liberal Democratic leadership after 1973. See R. DAVIDSON & W. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS
MEMBERS 273-74 (1983).
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have at least slim majorities in support of the coalition66 but did not have
supportive committee chairs.67
As the Court moved to the right of Congress, the cooperative rela-
tionship between the Court and Congress began to erode. While there
were no legislative overrides of the Court's civil rights statutory interpre-
tations between 1962 and 1972, there were significant overrides between
1972 and 1986. Several Congressmen publicly accused the Court, not
only of creating bad policy, but also of affirmatively misinterpreting legis-
lative intent.
L Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Statutes
In the first of these legislative overrides, Congress reacted to the
Court's own invitation. In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 6 a five-to-two Court held that attorney's fees were generally not
recoverable by "private attorneys general" enforcing important public
rights, unless the relevant federal statute contained explicit provisions for
fee-shifting.69 The Court's decision had what critics in Congress termed
a "devastating impact" on civil rights litigation.7" Within a year,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act,7 which
provided for fee-shifting in favor of civil rights plaintiffs. The Voting
Rights Act Extension in 1975 included similar fee-shifting provisions in
response to Alyeska. 7 The Equal Access to Justice Act of 1980, which
permitted counsel fee awards against the federal government in some
cases, was also in part a congressional response to Alyeska. 73
66. Although the Judiciary Committee was chaired by conservative Senator Thurmond (R-
S.C.) during this period, liberals had a theoretical working majority, consisting of the eight
Democrats and two moderate Republicans (Senators Mathias (R-Md.) and Specter (R-Pa.)).
Although the Labor and Human Resources Committee was chaired by conservative Senator Hatch
(R-Ut.) during this period, liberals here too had a working majority, consisting of the seven
Democrats and two moderate Republicans (Senators Stafford (R-Vt.) and Weicker (R-Ct.)). For the
members of these committees and their ADA scores, see THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLrrIcs
1982, 1984, and 1986, supra note 65.
67. Senator Hatch chaired the Labor and Human Resources Committee, and Senator
Thurmond chaired the Judiciary Committee. Both were much more conservative than the median
Republican Senator, and are hardly on the same chart as the median Democratic Senator. See
sources cited supra note 66.
68. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
69. Id. at 247-71.
70. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976); S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1976) [hereinafter Fees Act Senate Report] (Alyeska "created anomalous gaps in our civil
rights laws"). Note that Alyeska itself did not involve civil rights litigation (as I am using the term,
see supra note 17), but I include it because the congressional overrides of it focused on civil rights
litigation.
71. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)).
72. Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 402, 89 Stat. 400, 404 (1975); see S. Rae. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 40-43 [hereinafter Voting Rights Senate Report], reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs 774.
73. Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 203, 94 Stat. 2325 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988)).
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The legislative debates indicate that a majority of Congress
approved of the prior lower court fee-shifting practice and did not agree
with Alyeska. "This bill creates no startling new remedy-it only meets
the technical requirements that the Supreme Court has laid down if the
Federal courts are to continue the practice of awarding attorneys' fees
which had been going on for years prior to the Court's May [1975] deci-
sion."'74 Thus, Alyeska may be seen as stimulating Congress to enact into
law what it already approved of, and expected, in practice.
2. Age Discrimination Act Amendments of 1978
The next congressional override was more confrontational. It
involved the Court's interpretation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The ADEA's stated purpose was to
promote the employment of older persons and to "prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment.""5 An issue arising under the ADEA was
whether section 4(f)(2)'s exception for any "bona fide employee benefit
plan ... which is not a subterfuge to evade" the statute76 justified the
continuation of age-based mandatory retirement plans already in force
when the ADEA was enacted. The Department of Labor's regulations
implementing the Act narrowly construed the exception to protect only
those plans that offered "equal benefit or equal cost" to older workers.77
The circuits had split on the issue of whether the exclusion validated
some mandatory retirement plans. To resolve the split, the Senate com-
mittee, in a report dated October 12, 1977, specifically approved the
Fourth Circuit's decision in McMann v. United Airlines 78 as the correct
interpretation of the provision.79
Only two months later, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth
Circuit's McMann decision by a five-to-two majority. The Court inter-
preted the ADEA in line with the cases the Senate committee had criti-
cized and rejected in favor of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation. 80 The
dissenting opinion argued that the original expectations of Congress in
74. Fees Act Senate Report, supra note 70, at 4; see also id. at 1 ("The purpose of this
amendment is to remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws created by the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision in [Alyeska] .... "); Voting Rights Senate Report, supra note 72, at
42 ("The Alyeska decision created an unexpected and anomalous gap in our civil rights laws
whereby awards of fees are barred in the most fundamental civil rights cases.").
75. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2(b), 81 Stat. 602
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988)).
76. Id. § 4(f)(2), 81 Stat. 602, 603 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988)).
77. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.110, 860.120 (1976); see also Public Employees Retirement Sys. v.
Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854, 2862 (1989) (interpreting these sections).
78. 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976) (ruling that ADEA proscribed mandatory retirement of
employees at age 60 solely because of employee's membership in a retirement plan).
79. S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 504, 513.
80. United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 197-98 (1977).
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1967 had been to invalidate plans like United's.81 The majority
responded that the statutory exception for bona fide plans was
unambiguous.8 2
Predictably, Congress immediately overrode the Court's construc-
tion with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of
1978.83 Senator Javits (R-N.Y.), who had authored section 4(f)(2),
explained that the Labor Department in its regulations, and not the
Supreme Court, had correctly interpreted the section.84 The conference
committee reiterated the ADEA's "original purposes" and the original
legislative expectation that plans such as United's would be invalidated:
"In [McMann] the Supreme Court held to the contrary .... The confer-
ees specifically disagree with the Supreme Court's holding and reasoning
in that case."'85 This decisive overriding marked the beginning of the
present Court/Congress conflict over the interpretation of civil rights
laws.
3. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
By a six-to-three vote, the Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert 16 held that an employer's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabili-
ties from its employee disability plan does not violate title VII's proscrip-
tion against discrimination "'because of [the] individual's ... sex.' "87
Had the Court looked to the exclusion's disparate impact as it had in
Griggs, 8 it might have reached a different conclusion, since excluding
pregnancy-related conditions has an obvious gender-based effect.89 The
Court, however, interpreted title VII in light of its decision in Geduldig v.
Aiello, 9 0 where it held that pregnancy-based state regulation does not vio-
late the equal protection clause of the Constitution.91 Gilbert reasoned
81. Id. at 211-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 199, 203. Ironically, the Court still responded (somewhat lamely) to the dissent's
legislative history arguments. See id at 199-202.
83. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2, 92 Stat. 189 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1988)).
84. S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 31 (1977).
85. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 528, 529.
86. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
87. Id. at 133 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)(1) (1988)).
88. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
89. There is a Griggs-based counterargument: Surveys suggested that firms spent more money
on women's health plans even without pregnancy benefits, and the addition of pregnancy benefits
increased the already existing disparity even more in favor of female workers. See Legislation to
Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearing on HR. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before
the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 84, 85-86 (1971) [hereinafter PDA House Hearings] (statement of G. Brockwel
Heylin, labor relations attorney, Chamber of Commerce of the United States) (describing surveys).
90. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
91. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134 (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494).
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that classifications based upon pregnancy divide the world into two
groups: pregnant women versus men and nonpregnant women. Conse-
quently, the rule did not exclude anyone from benefits solely on the basis
of gender, and only "remove[d] one physical condition-pregnancy-
from the list of compensable disabilities."92 Although the majority
acknowledged that the exclusion was gender-related, it noted that the
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that this exclusion was a pretext for
sex-based discrimination.93 The Court's decision in Gilbert raised ques-
tions about the future viability of Griggs.94
The political response to Gilbert was swift and furious. The decision
came down in December 1976, and within a week, women's organiza-
tions, progressive unions, civil rights groups, and several general public
interest groups formed an umbrella lobbying group, the Campaign to
End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers.95 Early in 1977, legisla-
tion was introduced in both chambers to overrule Gilbert by defining dis-
crimination on the basis of gender to include pregnancy-based
distinctions.96 Hearings were held in both chambers in April 1977.17
Although business and insurance groups vigorously opposed the new leg-
islation, it was even more vigorously supported by the administration,
labor unions and the AFL-CIO, various women's groups, and assorted
civil rights and public interest groups. The relevant committees enthusi-
astically reported the bills (though the House committee bowed to pres-
sure from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops to add a proviso
that employers would not have to pay for abortion-related expenses98).
The resulting Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) is notable in
part because the key legislative players rushed to declare, with unusual
fervor, that the Court had misinterpreted title VII. The committee
92. Id.
93. Id. at 134-36.
94. Compare id. at 146 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) (raising the issue of Griggs but
refusing to join in any suggestion that it is not still good law) with id. (Stewart, J., concurring)
(saying viability of Griggs is not an issue and stating that in any event the Court's opinion does not
retreat from Griggs).
95. See PDA House Hearings, supra note 89, at 30-42, 47.
96. H.R. 5055, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Rep. Hawkins (D-Cal.) with 81
sponsors) (superseded by H.R. 6075, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Rep. Hawkins with
119 sponsors by 1978, when the bill was reported)); S. 995, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
97. See PDA House Hearings, supra note 89 (hearings held April 6, 1977, and June 29, 1977);
Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977. Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter PDA Senate
Hearings] (hearings held on April 26, 27, and 29, 1977).
98. See H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 13, 1978) [hereinafter PDA House
Report], reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4749. The Senate bill did not have
this proviso, see S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter PDA Senate Report], and
the House conference committee subsequently watered down the House version. See H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1786, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
4765.
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reports asserted that "the dissenting Justices [in Gilbert] correctly inter-
preted the Act."99 The statements of the PDA's sponsors were even
stronger: "By concluding that pregnancy discrimination is not sex dis-
crimination within the meaning of title VII, the Supreme Court disre-
garded the intent of Congress in enacting title VII. That intent was to
protect all individuals from unjust employment discrimination, including
pregnant women. '' 1°
4. The Voting Rights Act of 1982
The next major confrontation between the Court and Congress fol-
lowed the Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden. 10 1 The lower
courts had invalidated, as a violation of the fifteenth amendment, the at-
large method of electing city commissioners in Mobile, Alabama. The
Supreme Court reversed. The Court's plurality opinion"'2 admonished
the lower courts for not considering the statutory issue first-whether
the at-large system violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act-but then
held that section 2 merely "restated" fifteenth amendment require-
ments.10 3 The plurality opinion then found that the fifteenth amendment
required that challengers to a voting mechanism prove a discriminatory
intent in order to prevail. A fifth Justice articulated a different, and
arguably more restrictive, fifteenth amendment standard."4 The dissent-
ing Justices argued that the plurality's fifteenth amendment test repre-
sented a significant departure from the precedents established by the
Warren Court and early Burger Court. 05
Because there was no majority opinion, Bolden provoked as much
99. PDA House Report, supra note 98, at 2; see also id ("It is the Committee's view that [the
EEOC] guidelines rightly implemented the Title VII prohibition of sex discrimination in the 1964
Act."); PDA Senate Report, supra note 98, at 2-3 (same, almost verbatim).
100. PDA Senate Hearings, supra note 97, at 1 (opening statement of Sen. Williams (D-N.J.),
committee chairman). Williams was also a key supporter of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See also id.
at 6-20 (statement of Sen. Bayh (D-Ind.)); id. at 20-23 (statement of Sen. Mathias (R-Md.)); PDA
House Hearings, supra note 89, at 1 (opening statement of Rep. Hawkins (D-Cal.), committee
chairman). Senator Bayh, then-Representative Mathias, and Representative Hawkins were all
supporters of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
101. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
102. The plurality was authored by Justice Stewart, id at 58, one of the most conservative of the
Warren Court Justices. See Segal & Cover, supra note 61, at 561-62 (indicating Justice Stewart's
relative conservatism as compared to Justices Warren, Brennan, Fortas, Goldberg, Marshall, and
White). The opinion was joined by three of the four Nixon Justices, namely Burger, Powell, and
Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun, the other Nixon appointee, concurred in the result. Bolden, 446 U.S.
at 80-83. Justice Stevens, appointed by Ford, concurred in the judgment. Id. at 83-94. The three
other Warren Court holdovers-Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White-dissented. Id. at 94-141.
103. Id. at 61.
104. See id. at 83-94 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
105. See id at 94 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 108-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (relying on
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), and Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965)).
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confusion as outrage. Decided in April 1980, Bolden came at the worst
possible time for a legislative override. It was decided at the end of
Congress' second session and in a critical presidential election year. As a
consequence, Congress did not have adequate time to override Bolden,
and so postponed serious consideration until 1981.
That year, Republicans took control of the Presidency and the
Senate. Nevertheless, serious efforts were mounted early in the next
Congress to override Bolden's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act. 0 6
Hearings during the summer of 1981 yielded virtually unchallenged testi-
mony from law professors, litigation groups, and groups in the civil
rights coalition that Bolden was a radical departure from the Court's
statutory, as well as constitutional, precedents and that Bolden had fash-
ioned an approach to voting rights that was both confusing and counter-
productive. 107 With little open opposition, Congress overrode Bolden in
the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982.108
Just as had occurred twice in 1978, the 1982 legislative override was
accompanied by a congressional claim that it was defending the statutory
status quo. Key legislators stated that the Court, not the Congress, had
shifted policy direction; Congress was merely correcting the Court's erro-
neous interpretation. The Republican-controlled Senate Judiciary
Committee put it most carefully:
While the Committee finds that Congress did not seek to include an
intent test in the original provision of section 2, a plurality of four justices
in [Bolden] thought that it did. The Court is the ultimate interpreter of
laws once enacted. But in any event, there is no question that Congress
may now decide that an intent requirement is inappropriate for section 2,
and amend [the] statute to make that point clearly. 109
5. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986
In 1986, Congress enacted three different statutes to override three
Supreme Court decisions, all involving the rights of handicapped
Americans. The first of these overridings was fairly routine. In United
106. See H.R. 3112, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1981) (introduced by Rep. Rodino (D-N.J.) on
April 7); H.R. 3198, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 72 (1981) (introduced by Rep. Hyde (R-Ill.) on April 9); S.
995, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Sens. Mathias (R-Md.) and Kennedy (D-Mass.)).
107. See Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. passim (1981).
108. Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
109. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 n.49, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 177, 194 n.49; see also id. at 26, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 177, 203 ("A fair reading of Bolden reveals that the plurality opinion was a marked departure
from earlier Supreme Court and lower court vote dilution cases."); id. at 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 177, 205 ("The 'results' standard is meant to restore the pre-Mobile
legal standard ... ").
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States Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 110
the Court had interpreted section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
to be inapplicable to air carriers.III Within the year, Congress responded
with the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986,112 which authorized the
Department of Transportation to develop regulations protecting handi-
capped people against discrimination. Unlike the PDA, the ADEA
Amendments, or the Voting Rights Act Amendments, this statute
reflected congressional disagreement with the Court's outcome, not its
role in the case.113
The same cannot be said of Congress' response to Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon. 114 By a five-to-four vote, the Court held that the
Rehabilitation Act had not abrogated the states' eleventh amendmentimmunity. The Court's holding was based upon its increasingly aggres-
sive stance toward protecting state sovereign immunity. 15 The decision
greatly surprised Congress, which believed that it had specifically abro-
gated the sovereign immunity defense in the Act. Section 504 prohibited
discrimination against the handicapped in "any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." '116 Obviously, this included many
state programs. Moreover, Congress had conducted its debates under
the assumption that the states could be sued. 17 Within a month of the
Court's decision, a bill was introduced to override it.118 The override
provisions were incorporated into the omnibus Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986.119
The override of Atascadero was not a difficult decision for Congress.
It considered the Court's interpretation simply wrong. "The Supreme
Court's decision misinterpreted congressional intent," stated the commit-
tee report. "Such a gap in Section 504 coverage was never intended. It
would be inequitable for Section 504 to mandate state compliance with
110. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
111. Id. at 599 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).
112. Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080.
113. See S. RPp. No. 99-400, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986) ("In recognition of the unique
difficulties now faced by handicapped air travelers, [the bill] would mitigate the effect of DOTv. PVA
by amending section 404 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to prohibit specifically discrimination
against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals."), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2328, 2330.
114. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
115. See id. at 242 ('Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal
courts has been negated stems from recognition of the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in our federal system.") (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman
(Pennhurst I1), 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)).
116. Id. at 245 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)).
117. See id. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. S. 1579, 99th Cong., 2d 5ess. (1986) (introduced on August 1 by Sen. Cranston (D-Cal.),
with five cosponsors, including two liberal Republicans-Sen. Stafford (R-Vt.) and Sen. Weicker (R-
Conn.)).
119. Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1845 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988)).
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its provisions and yet deny litigants the right to enforce their rights in
Federal courts when State or State agency actions are at issue."' 120 This
reasoning was precisely that of the Atascadero dissenters, whose views
the committee report endorsed.
6. The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986
The third statutory override of 1986 also involved the rights of the
handicapped. In Smith v. Robinson,'2 the Court held that the
Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA)'22 was
handicapped children's exclusive source of remedies.' 23 As a conse-
quence, handicapped children could not sue under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, which offered the advantage of counsel fee awards to
prevailing plaintiffs.' 24 Bills to overrule Smith v. Robinson were intro-
duced within months of the decision and enjoyed substantial bipartisan
support. Although bills passed both the House and Senate in 1985, the
measure languished in conference for almost a year. The source of the
delay was a provision in the Senate bill imposing limits on fee awards to
publicly funded legal aid lawyers. t2 In July 1986, after that issue was
resolved, both chambers approved by voice vote the Handicapped Chil-
dren's Protection Act (HCPA).'2 6 Congressional rhetoric about being
disappointed with the Court was not so keen for this bill as it had been in
earlier overrides. Nevertheless, the committee report suggested that once
again Congress agreed with the dissenting opinion.'27
In overriding Robinson, however, Congress adopted a more tangible
way of registering its disapproval. Enacted at the end of 1986, the
HCPA provided that it would apply to all EHA actions pending on July
4, 1984 (the day before the Court's decision), as well as to all actions
initiated after July 3, 1984.128 This provision was not only a slap at the
Court, but also triggered open presidential opposition and risked a veto.
Nonetheless, the President ultimately signed the bill, over his constitu-
120. S. REP. No. 99-388, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1986).
121. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
122. 84 Stat. 175 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1988)).
123. Robinson, 468 U.S. at 1009, 1021.
124. See id. at 1021.
125. See 1985 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 297; 1986 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 271-72.
126. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988)).
127. See S. REP. No. 99-112, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 [hereinafter HCPA Senate Report] ("The
situation which has resulted from the Smith v. Robinson decision was summarized by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in their dissenting opinion: 'Congress will now have to take the
time to revisit the matter.'" (quoting Robinson, 468 U.S. at 1031)), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1798, 1799.
128. Handicapped Children's Protection Act, § 5, 100 Stat. 798 (1986) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415 (1988)); see HCPA Senate Report, supra note 127, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 1800.
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tional objections.12 9
C. Court/Congress/President Conflict: 1985-90
Even though no general preference shifts occurred in the late 1980s,
the Court/Congress conflict heated up, intensified by more presidential
involvement. The Court continued its rightward drift, with personnel
changes in 1987 and 1990.130 Congress moved to the left on civil rights
matters after the 1986 election.1 3 1 The Presidency showed the most sig-
nificant movement by implementing a virtually unprecedented confronta-
tional strategy against civil rights legislation. Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson had battled Congress for civil rights legislation; Presidents
Nixon, Ford, and Carter had cooperated with Congress-driven initiatives
in the 1970s. And, although the early Reagan administration had pub-
licly expressed reluctance about the Voting Rights Amendments of 1982,
it did not take a strong public position against the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986 or the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986. The later
Reagan administration and the Bush administration reversed this trend,
actively opposing important congressional overrides of civil rights prece-
dents, using the veto threat aggressively, and actually vetoing civil rights
legislation for the first time since Reconstruction.
1. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988
The most important override since the PDA involved Congress'
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell. 132
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimina-
tion in any "education program or activity receiving Federal financial
129. Statement on Signing S. 415 Into Law, 1986 PUB. PAPERS 1056 (Ronald Reagan, Aug. 5,
1986) ("The retroactive application of the act to cases that are no longer pending permits the
Congress to displace the judicial function by interfering with a final judgment.").
130. The Court shifted to the right when Justice Kennedy succeeded Justice Powell in 1987, and
Justice Souter succeeded Justice Brennan in 1990. Note that Segal & Cover, supra note 61, at 560-
62, list Justice Powell as more conservative than Justice Kennedy on civil liberties issues (including
due process, freedom of expression, criminal justice as well as civil rights issues). In my opinion, on
such issues as affirmative action, Justice Powell is more liberal. For example, Justice Powell joined
the Court in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), whereas Justice Kennedy has
joined opinions, such as Wards Cove, that are hostile to affirmative action.
131. The Democrats picked up eight Senate seats and control of the Senate. That re-established
a liberal civil rights leadership in the Senate (Senators Mitchell and Cranston), and strengthened
liberal control over the key committees. Senator Biden's (D-Del.) Judiciary Committee has had a
liberal majority of nine to five on most issues (the eight Democrats plus Senator Specter (R-Pa.)).
Senator Kennedy's Labor and Human Services Committee has had a liberal majority of eleven to five
on most issues (nine Democrats and Senators Stafford (R-Vt.) and Weicker (R-Conn.) in 1987-89;
nine Democrats and Senators Durenberger (R-Minn.) and Jeffords (R-Vt.) in 1989-91). See THE
ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1988, supra note 65, for lists of Senators, committee
memberships, and ADA scores for committee members.
132. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
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assistance." 133 Grove City College accepted no direct federal assistance,
but its students received federal financial aid. A begrudging, albeit unan-
imous, Supreme Court33 held that even indirect financial assistance
brought the college within the coverage of title IX, but by a six-to-two
vote it held that only Grove City's financial aid department (and not
other departments) fell within the statute's "program or activity" lan-
guage. 135 The dissenting Justices argued that this interpretation of "pro-
gram or activity" was inconsistent with the assumptions Congress made
when it passed the amendments in 1972.136
The dissenters' view was widely held in Congress. Within a month
and a half of the decision, bills to override Grove City had been intro-
duced in Congress, with dozens of members eager to cosponsor.137 If
rhetoric is any gauge, the level of congressional outrage was at its highest
since Gilbert. 138 One member exclaimed:
It is sort of shocking that the Supreme Court of the United States has to
get this kind of a lesson in 1984. This is not unsettled law. As a matter
of fact, they are going against their own decisions. It leaves me slightly
amazed that on a matter of this rather elementary nature in civil rights
law that we're forced to come back to the ramparts one more time.139
Many of the key legislative players involved in creating title IX were still
in Congress. They readily came forward to denounce the Court's conclu-
sions about the original legislative intent."1
On May 23, less than three months after the Grove City decision,
133. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988)).
134. Justice Powell (a Nixon appointee) wrote a separate opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger
(a Nixon appointee) and Justice O'Connor (a Reagan appointee) joined, to express the view that "the
case is an unedifying example of overzealousness on the part of the Federal Government." Grove
City, 465 U.S. at 576.
135. Justice Stevens refused to join the Court's holding on this point but did not express a view
on the merits. Id. at 579-81 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The only
dissenters were Justices Brennan and Marshall, the remnants of the Warren Court's liberal majority.
Id. at 581-604 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. Id. at 581-604 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. H.R. 5490, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (introduced on April 12 by Rep. Simon, together
with 71 cosponsors, which increased to 129 cosponsors when hearings began in May 1984); S. 2568,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (introduced on April 12 by Sen. Kennedy).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 86-100.
139. Civil Rights Act of 1984: Joint Hearings Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor
and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1984) (statement of Rep. Conyers (D-Mich.), who was an original supporter of
title IX); see also id. at 13 (statement of Rep. Simon) ("In Grove City the Supreme Court ignored the
congressional intent and rejected a long history of broad executive branch enforcement of Title IX of
the 1972 Education Amendments. We must correct this result."); id. (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.)) (Court's decision "does not enunciate the intent of Congress when title IX
was passed almost 10 years ago").
140. See id. at 40-53 (statement of Sen. Bayh, whom the Grove City Court had acknowledged as
the key player for title IX (Grove City, 465 U.S. at 567)); id. at 55-56 (statement of Sen. Javits (R-
N.Y.), the key player on the Republican side).
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relevant House committees reported a broad override bill. The day
before, the President had publicly indicated a willingness to veto the
bill. 4 ' During extensive hearings, the administration was virtually the
only force opposing the override. 42 The House passed the bill on June
26 by an overwhelming margin (375 to 32).143 Because the Senate bill
had been bottled up in its committee by Senator Hatch (R-Utah), the
House bill became the mechanism by which the Senate considered over-
riding Grove City. Pressured by the administration and Hatch, the
Republican leadership refused to bring up the bill for consideration
unless a compromise were worked out, and compromise negotiations
occupied the remainder of the summer. At the end of September, the
bill's supporters (there were by then 63 sponsors) forced the Senate to
consider it. But Senator Hatch and the bill's other opponents vexed the
bill with so many killer amendment proposals that the bill's supporters
ultimately agreed to table it."4
The next Congress immediately took up the Grove City issue.
Again, Senator Hatch's committee buried the Senate bill, while the rele-
vant House committees reported a strong Grove City bill.'45 The bill,
however, never came up for a vote in the House. It ran into difficulties
when the U.S. Catholic Conference expressed strong opposition, claiming
that the bill would have the practical effect of forcing Catholic hospitals
to perform abortions and schools to fund student abortions. One House
committee accepted the Catholic Conference's position. But the bill's
supporters were unwilling to compromise the right to abortion, and
negotiations continued through the summer and fall without result.
When Congress next reconvened, Democrats controlled both the
House and Senate. The Senate acted first, with 56 Senators sponsoring
its Grove City bill.'46 The Senate bill received expedited hearings in a
committee no longer chaired by Senator Hatch. The Senate committee
141. 1984 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 240.
142. H.R. REP. No. 829, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. pts. 1 & 2 (1984).
143. 130 CONG. REc. 18,761, 18,817 (1984).
144. This was procedurally complicated. On September 20, sponsoring Senators Kennedy and
Packwood (R-Ore.) announced that talks with the Administration had broken down. On September
27, Senator Byrd (D-W.Va.) introduced the bill as an amendment to the fiscal 1985 continuing
appropriations resolution, H.R.J. Res. 648, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The presiding officer
sustained the Republican majority leadership's objection that the amendment was out-of-order, but
the full Senate overruled the officer (51 to 48). 130 CONG. REc. 27,452, 27,487 (1984).
A blur of further amendments followed, including a Hatch amendment to restrict federal
judges' authority to order school busing, but the Senate invoked cloture on September 29. 130
CONG. REC. 27,826 (1984). Despite cloture, the Senate was now-at the end of the session in a
presidential election year-faced with voting on a number of controversial amendments, and on
whether some of them (such as the busing amendment) were in order. Because of these
circumstances, the Republican sponsors agreed to kill the bill for that Congress.
145. See H.R. REp. No. 963, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1985).
146. S. 557, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S2249-56 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1987).
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reported the bill on June 5, 1987.147 The Senate committee report argued
that Congress had originally intended for title IX and related statutes to
have institution-wide coverage. It maintained that executive implemen-
tation and interpretation of those statutes was premised upon that under-
standing, as were judicial interpretations prior to Grove City. "The
purpose of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 is to reaffirm pre-
Grove City College judicial and executive branch interpretations and
enforcement practices which provided for broad coverage of the anti-
discrimination provisions of these civil rights statutes." '148 The report
stated that Grove City misconstrued congressional intent and created
absurd results.
Despite the committee report's strong wording, a Senate preoccu-
pied with the Bork confirmation hearings did not get to the bill in 1987.
In January 1988, the Senate passed the bill14 9 after accepting an amend-
ment that restricted some protections for women seeking abortions; the
House followed in March.150 President Reagan vetoed the bill on March
16, arguing that it would unnecessarily expand the federal government's
power at the expense of religious and other private freedoms. Within a
week, both chambers of Congress overrode the veto by lopsided
margins.151
2. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990
When the Court's McMann decision was being debated in Congress
in 1978, the committee report and Senator Javits disapproved of the
Court's reasoning as well as result. However, the actual statute that
overruled McMann only added a proviso to protect against involuntary
retirement. As a consequence, employee plans that were not a "subter-
fuge" to evade the statute were still exempt. Debate over this exemption
returned to the Court in Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v.
Betts. 152 The case involved a denial of disability benefits because of
age-a situation which on its face seemed to violate the Act. Relying in
part on the McMann understanding of subterfuge, the Court by a seven-
to-two vote upheld the discriminatory disability plan. 53 This immedi-
147. S. REP. No. 64, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (vote to report was 12-4), reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3. This report contains an excellent summary of the history of
the Senate's attempts to override Grove City from 1984 to 1987.
148. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4.
149. 134 CONG. REc. S266 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988).
150. 134 CONG. REc. H597-98 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988).
151. 134 CONG. REc. S2765 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988) (vote of 73-24); 134 CONG. REC. H1071-
72 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988) (vote of 292-133).
152. 109 S. Ct. 2854 (1989).
153. See id. at 2861 ("As Congress did not amend the relevant statutory language, we see no
reason to depart from our holding in McMann that the term 'subterfuge' is to be given its ordinary
meaning .... ).
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ately reinvigorated the McMann understanding of "subterfuge," which
had been attacked as a misinterpretation of legislative intent by the very
legislators responsible for the ADEA's passage in 1978. The Court held
that under the statute's "plain meaning," the plan at issue was not a
subterfuge and, hence, was exempt from the statutory prohibition.154
The Court rejected, as inconsistent with the statute's plain meaning, the
Department of Labor's "equal benefit or equal cost" regulations that had
been endorsed by the key players in 1978.155
Betts shocked most people who followed post-1978 ADEA develop-
ments, because it was widely assumed that the congressional override of
McMann had cemented the equal benefit or equal cost rule into the stat-
ute. Within two months of the Betts decision, bills were introduced in
both the House and Senate to override Betts. 156 These bills stated on
their face: "The Congress finds that, as a result of the decision of the
Supreme Court in [Betts], legislative action is necessary to restore the
original congressional intent in passing and amending the [ADEA]."' 157
The bill's sponsors barely concealed their distrust of the Court: "In
Betts, the Supreme Court once again showed its disdain for civil rights by
reaching the completely unexpected conclusion that employers are free to
engage in age-based discrimination against their employees in the area of
employee benefits." '158
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources also sharply criticized the Supreme Court's "erroneous" inter-
pretation not once, but twice:
The Committee regrets that the Supreme Court in Betts chose not to
credit the language of the 1978 Conference Report, language that
appeared in the Congressional Record and was overwhelmingly approved
by both Houses of Congress. The Committee hopes that in the future,
the Supreme Court will take more seriously such expressions of legisla-
tive intent, particularly when they are subject to the same review and
ratification as the language of the statute.159
The report also defended a retroactive overruling of Betts. 160
154. See iL at 2863-64.
155. See id at 2862 ("The requirement that employers show a cost-based justification for age-
related reductions in benefits appears nowhere in the statute itself.").
156. H.R. 3200, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1511, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
157. H.R. 3200, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989); S. 1511, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1990).
158. 135 CONG. REc. S9949 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Pryor (D-Ark.), sponsor
of S. 1511); see also ia at S9949-50 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)) (commenting that in a
"stunning" decision, Supreme Court "reverses 20 years of the settled law," and castigating "the
tortured logic and cruel result of the Supreme Court decision"); id. at S9950 (statement of Sen.
Jeffords (R-Vt.)) ("I am personally convinced that the Congress which enacted the ADEA had no
intention of broadly exempting from coverage so integral a portion of the employment relationship
as employee benefits.").
159. S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1990).
160. See iad at 30-31.
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The committee bill's strong expression of disapproval met resistance
in the Senate. Through the summer, Senators from both parties negoti-
ated a broadly acceptable compromise bill. The compromise adjusted
the bill's substantive provisions and largely removed its retroactivity
provisions but retained the textual provision overruling Betts by name. 161
The Senate and the House passed the override bill by overwhelming mar-
gins in late September and early October.1 62
3. The Proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990
The Court decided Patterson, Wards Cove, Martin v. Wilks,
Hopkins, Zipes, and Lorance at the end of the 1988 Term, about the
same time as Betts. 163 All six decisions had implications for title VII.
During the summer of 1989, civil rights groups in Washington drafted
legislation to overrule all the decisions. They coordinated their efforts
with the Senate Democrats, especially Senators Kennedy (D-Mass.) and
Metzenbaum (D-Ohio). Because of the number of decisions to be over-
ruled and the complexity of the political and constitutional issues, negoti-
ations over the terms of the draft continued through the autumn and
winter. Finally, on February 7, 1990, Senator Kennedy and thirty-three
cosponsors introduced a bill to overrule these six decisions, as well as
three earlier Supreme Court cases having similar implications for title
VII.164 The same bill was introduced in the House by Representative
Hawkins (D-Cal.) and many cosponsors. 165
The bill's language and content indicated Congress' wholehearted
rejection of the Court's decisions. The bill announced that "in a series of
recent decisions addressing employment discrimination claims under
Federal law, the Supreme Court cut back dramatically on the scope and
effectiveness of civil rights protections."1 66 It added that the bill was
designed "to respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by restor-
ing the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those
decisions." '167 The substantive sections of the bill then amended title VII
or section 1981 to override one or more of the offending Supreme Court
161. See S. 1511, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 101, 136 CONG. REC. S13,611 (daily ed. Sept. 24,
1990).
162. See 136 CONG. REc. S13,611 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (Senate vote 94-1); 136 CONG. REc.
H8738 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (House vote 406-17).
163. See supra notes 3-13 and accompanying text.
164. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. Rac. S1018-21 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990). The
other three cases were: Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), Evans v.
Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), and Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1985).
165. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H364 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990).
166. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(1), 136 CONG. REC. S1019 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990).
167. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (a)(1), (b)(l), 136 CONG. REC. S1019 (daily ed. Feb. 7,
1990).
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cases. 16 8 With complex transition rules, the bill overruled most of the
nine Supreme Court cases retroactively.1 69  The sponsors of the bill
roundly indicted the Supreme Court's performance in the 1988 Term. "I
believe the Supreme Court's recent rulings represent an effort to renege
on history," said Senator Jeffords (R-Vt.).' 70
At hearings on the bills in the House and Senate during February
and March, the administration agreed that Patterson and Lorance should
be overruled, but strongly opposed overruling Wards Cove and Martin v.
Wilks. 171  The administration's position, eloquently articulated by
Senator Hatch, was that the provision overriding Wards Cove would all
but compel employers to adopt quotas by making title VII liability hinge
on bad numbers.' 72 Hatch later, during the floor debates, further argued
that the provision overriding Martin v. Wilks was unfair to white males
penalized by old consent decrees and, in fact, raised due process
problems.'73 The administration and the business community were also
concerned about the bill's creation of new compensatory and punitive
damages remedies for violations of title VII. Attorney General
Thornburgh explored these and other concerns in detail in a letter to
Senator Kennedy, indicating that he would urge the President to veto the
bill in anything like its current form. 74
In negotiations that spring, Senate Democrats, moderate Senate
168. Section 4 overruled Wards Cove and set standards for proof of unlawful employment
practices in disparate impact cases. Section 5 overruled Hopkins by stipulating that a discriminatory
practice need not be the sole motivating factor to make out a violation of the statute. Section 6
replaced Martin v. Wilks with guidelines for assuring finality of consent decrees. Section 7 amended
existing provisions of title VII to overrule Lorance. Section 9 included a series of technical
procedural amendments to title VII to overrule Zipes, Crawford, and JeffD. Section 10 provided for
interest against the United States, overruling Shaw. Section 12 amended section 1981 to overrule
Patterson.
169. Section 15(a) provided that most of the substantive provisions would be retroactively
applicable, beginning on the dates the Court had handed down the relevant decisions.
170. 136 CONG. Rc. S1022 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990); see also id. at S1018 (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) ("In the past year ... the Supreme Court has issued a series of rulings that mark an
abrupt and unfortunate departure from its historic vigilance in protecting civil rights. The fabric of
justice has been torn.").
171. Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2104 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Senate Civil Rights Hearings];
Civil Rights Act of 1990: Joint Hearings on H.R. 4000 Before the House Comm. on Education and
Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 358-62 (1990). The administration's override bill was introduced on February
22 by Senator Hatch in S. 2166, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See 136 CONG. REC S1522 (daily ed.
Feb. 22, 1990).
172. 1990 Senate Civil Rights Hearings, supra note 171, at 5 (stating that the bill "so
dramatically change[s] title VII that the only way to aviod being sued is to hire solely by numbers, to
use quotas for hiring and promotion").
173. 136 CONG. Rac. S9830-31 (daily ed. July 17, 1990).
174. Letter from Attorney General Richard Thornburgh to Senator Edward Kennedy (Apr. 3,
1990).
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Republicans, and the White House sought to resolve these problems.
The Wards Cove/Griggs issue of how to express the proof required to
establish and defend against disparate impact cases posed the biggest
hurdle. Hoping to reach a compromise with the administration, the
Senate twice postponed consideration of the bill. With the same purpose,
the Democratic and Republican supporters offered several amended
bills.175 On July 12, it appeared that the Democrats and the administra-
tion had reached agreement on the key provision (a definition of "busi-
ness necessity"). 176 However, the deal immediately unraveled, possibly
because of cold feet in the administration. 177 The negotiations continued.
The Senate voted for cloture of debate on July 17,178 over the bitter
objections of the Republican leadership and despite bipartisan irritation
over the lengthy impasse with the administration. After the cloture vote,
the White House urged continuation of the negotiations.1 79 Negotiations
continued, and yet another Kennedy-Jeffords substitute was offered up.
The negotiations lasted into the final day of the Senate's consideration of
the bill,180 when, at the eleventh hour, they collapsed over the quota
issue. ("Quotas shmotas," grumbled Senator Kennedy.)"8 ' The Senate
passed the second Kennedy-Jeffords substitute by a vote of 65 to 34.182
The House passed a similar bill on August 3, by a vote of 272 to 154.183
As is often the case, negotiations over the bill's content continued
almost without interruption after passage by both chambers and during
the conference committee process. One conference report was submitted
to Congress on September 26.184 The House voted to recommit so that
the conferees could add further language to appease the President."'5 A
175. The Kennedy-Danforth amended version of S. 2104 that emerged from committee was to
be superseded by a Kennedy-Jeffords substitute. See 136 CONG. REC. S9325-27 (daily ed. July 10,
1990). A Kassebaum-Gorton compromise proposal also appeared, see 136 CONG. REC. S9756 (daily
ed. July 16, 1990), but was then withdrawn.
176. See 136 CONG. REc. S9824-25 (daily ed. July 17, 1990) (statement of Sen. Danforth
describing the oral agreement and its mysterious unraveling); id. at S9829-30 (statement of Sen.
Kennedy describing the apparent deal and the apparent impasse that nonetheless developed).
177. See Holmes, Accord Is Sought on Rights Measure to Avert a Veto, N.Y. Times, July 20,
1990, at Al, col. 6.
178. 136 CONG. REc. S9823 (daily ed. July 17, 1990) (vote of 62-38, including 8 Republicans
voting for cloture).
179. Id. at S9836 (statement of Sen. Danforth).
180. 136 CONG. REc. S9918-19, S9934 (daily ed. July 18, 1990).
181. Id. at S9947.
182. Id. at S9966.
183. 136 CONG. REc. H6769 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990). The key moves during the House
deliberation were the party-line vote to adopt a modified closed rule restricting amendments on the
bill, see 136 CONG. REc. H6336 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990), and the defeat of a Republican substitute
by a party-line 238-188 vote, see 136 CONG. REC. H6768 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990).
184. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 755, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. H8045-50
(daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990).
185. 136 CONG. Rmc. H9405-06 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1990) (recommittal motion vote of 375-45).
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second conference report was submitted on October 12.186 The final con-
ference bill made a number of changes in the Wards Cove provision in an
attempt to gain White House support. These changes included a more
liberal definition of the business necessity defense in disparate impact
cases, statutory language discouraging employers from adopting quotas,
confirmation that bad numbers alone do not violate title VII, and a
requirement that plaintiffs prove which employer practices cause the dis-
parate impact.1 87
By October, the White House position seemed more conservative
than it had been in July, and the President seemed ready to veto the bill
despite all concessions. 88 Nonetheless, both chambers adopted the con-
ference bill by lopsided, but not veto-proof, margins.1 89 On October 20,
the President sent Congress his own civil rights bill, which would have
overruled or modified most of the cases that Congress sought to overrule
(but in different ways, of course). It was ignored by Congress. Two days
later the President vetoed Congress' bill, 190 and the Senate failed by one
vote to override the veto.91
II
POSITIVE GAME THEORY ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSES TO THE SUPREME COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
STATUTES
The story told in Part I demonstrates in a general but fairly concrete
way that civil rights statutory policy is dynamic and interactive. Civil
rights policy is interactive because it involves the cooperation, and often
the conflict, among the Congress (which enacts the statutes), the
President (who has veto power and influences the statute's implementa-
tion), and the Court (which presides over the statute's interpretation).
Civil rights policy is also dynamic. For one thing, the actual mix of stat-
186. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 136 CONG. REc. H9552-59
(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990).
187. 136 CONG. REc. S15,327 (daily ed. Oct 16, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). These
changes were made in response to negotiations among Senator Hatch, Senator Specter, and former
Secretary of Transportation William Coleman. Id. at S15,328 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
188. See id. at S15341-42 (statement of Sen. Jeflords); Letter from Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh to Senator Robert Dole (Oct. 12, 1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REc. S15,328-29 (daily
ed. Oct. 16, 1990). Apparently, Senator Hatch would have been willing to support the conference
bill if the White House had acquiesced. See 136 CONG. REc. S15,328 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990)
(statement of Sen. Hatch); aL at S15,332 (statement of Sen. Specter).
189. Id. at S15,407 (Senate vote, 62-34); 136 CONG. REc. H9994-95 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990)
(House vote, 273-154).
190. 136 CONG. Rac. S16,562-63 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (reprinting the veto message).
191. At 11:50 p.m. on October 24, 1990, the Senate voted by 66 to 34 to override the veto.
Fifty-five Democrats and eleven Republicans voted to override. 136 CONG. REc. S16,589 (daily ed.
Oct. 24, 1990).
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utes changes constantly as Congress enacts new statutes. In addition, the
interpretation and implementation by the President and the Court
strongly affect the evolution of each statute and the way the statutes knit
together over time. Therefore, the dramatic changes in the attitudes of
the President and of the Court (and, to a lesser extent, of Congress)
toward these statutes have significantly affected the statutory policy.
Part I makes traditional political theory assumptions (such as the
importance of interest groups and committees), but is otherwise athe-
oretic. Part II borrows from positive political theory a model of
Congress/agency interaction and uses it to construct a theoretical frame-
work for thinking about the Congress/Court/President interaction over
time. This model does not perfectly explain the data, and I then suggest
a modified model that does. As modified, this political theory framework
suggests some interesting twists on the history outlined in Part I and
some directions for future interaction. It indicates that the Court/
Congress conflict will continue into the 1990s (though it is not clear at
what level of intensity). Perhaps surprisingly, it suggests that the main
variable in the Court/Congress balance will be the political preferences
of the Presidency.
A. A Game Theoretic Analysis of Supreme Court Policymaking in
Civil Rights Statutes
For some time now, positive political theory has been developing
game theoretical models of the legislative process. Much of the theory
has focused on legislator incentives and, specifically, the operation of a
legislature in which members are primarily motivated by a desire to be
reelected.' 92 Recently, positive political theory has explored issues aris-
ing from the legislature's interaction with agencies and the President. 193
Scholars, most notably John Ferejohn, have been developing a model of
Congress/agency interaction to explain Congress' ability to influence
agency decisionmaking over time, even when it does not enact statutes
192. See B. CAIN, J. FEREJOHN & M. FIORINA, THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY
SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE (1987); M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE
WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION
(1974). For a more public-regarding view of legislator motivations, see R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN
IN COMMITTEES (1973); K. KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991);
A. MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1983).
193. See Ferejohn & Shipan, Congressional Influence on Administrative Agencies: A Case Study
of Telecommunications Policy, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 393 (L. Dodd & B. Oppenheimer 4th
ed. 1989); Mathews, Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game, 104 Q.J. ECON. 347 (1989); Moe,
An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional Dominance, 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475 (1987);
Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by
the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 756 (1983).
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that overrule the agency directly.' 94 Their model, the positive political
theory model, might be applied to understand legislative control of judi-
cial statutory interpretation as well. 195
The Court/Congress/President game, which follows from this
model, is relatively straightforward. It is played out on a one-dimen-
sional linear field that starts with the optimal political preferences of the
major players, charting those preferences from left/liberal to right/con-
servative (here, the preferences concern civil rights legislation). I start
with the assumptions of the positive political theorists who developed the
outlines of my Court/Congress/President game: The political players
are the Supreme Court (C), which interprets existing civil rights statutes;
the legislative gatekeepers (G), which substantially control Congress'
agenda and which I consider to be the committees with jurisdiction over
civil rights bills plus the majority party leadership; 196 the Congress,
which has the power to overrule the Court and is treated here as a single
chamber whose preferences are represented by those of its median mem-
ber (hence the notation M);' 97 and the President (P), who has the power
to veto legislation.
The game is played in the following sequence. The Court makes the
first move when it interprets a civil rights statute. Once the Court has
194. See Ferejohn & Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION (1990).
195. The most notable paper is B. Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional
Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell (May 1989) (Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University)
(on file with author). See also J. Ferejohn & B. Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: A Strategic Theory
of Interpretation (prepared for delivery at the Conference on Constitutional Law and Economics,
Stanford Law School (Oct. 25-26, 1990)) (on file with author).
196. This is a departure from traditional positive political theory, which assumes a single
gatekeeping committee. In both the House and Senate, there are two committees with potential
jurisdiction over antidiscrimination legislation-the judiciary committee and the labor committee.
The existence of the two committees in each chamber itself makes the assignment power (by the
House Speaker and the Senate Majority Leader) significant, but in both chambers the leadership
exercises other powers as well. The House Rules Committee, since 1973 an arm of the leadership,
can do much to dictate the terms of the debate by seeking closed or modified closed rules. (This is
another departure from Ferejohn and Shipan, who assume that the House can always overrule a
closed rule suggestion.) The Senate Majority Leader has weaker power in this regard but often
affects the agenda by orchestrating or frustrating unanimous consent agreements, by deciding which
bills to call up and in which order, and by securing desired rulings on points of procedure. For
example, Majority Leader Baker's delaying tactics in the summer of 1984 were instrumental in
killing the Grove City bill that year.
197. Using the preferences of the median legislator to indicate the legislative outcome is itself a
"strong" assumption based on other assumptions such as a one-dimensional political spectrum and
the inability of legislative processes to aggregate intensity of preference. Nonetheless, the median
voter rule is a powerful and well-established theoretical construct in the collective choice literature.
Basically, it suggests that on a single left-right spectrum where only one outcome is possible and no
vote trading is permitted, the favored position of the median voter will prevail. See A. DoWNs, AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 114-41 (1957); Bowen, The Interpretation of Voting in the
Allocation of Economic Resources, in READINGS IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 115-32 (K. Arrow & T.
Scitovsky eds. 1969); Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41-57 (1929).
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interpreted the statute, the gatekeepers then decide whether they want to
seek a legislative override; if they do, Congress must decide what policy
to adopt, and it is not constrained by the gatekeepers' choice. If
Congress passes a statute, the President must decide whether to veto it.
Should the President veto it, Congress must decide whether to override




No No No No
The Court/Congress/President game assumes that each player
operates with complete information about other players' preferences,
and, therefore, perfectly anticipates the future course of play. Moreover,
each player in making its moves will not want to make a decision that
will be overturned by another player with the authority to do so. In
other words, in deciding whether to act, each player will do nothing if it
realizes that its decision will be overturned by the next player.
The game's sequential nature, the players' possession of perfect
information, and their reluctance to be overruled make two other prefer-
ence points important. One is a player's "indifference point," the point
on the spectrum that the player likes just as much as another point in the
opposite direction (the player is indifferent as to the two points). For
example, in our civil rights game, the gatekeepers' preferences (G) are
usually to the left of those of the median member (M). The gatekeepers'
indifference point (G(M)) is the point to the left of their preferred point
that they like just as much as they like M, but in the other direction. 9 s
198. Or stated more formally: If the gatekeepers' preferences were to the left of the median
legislator's, and the intensity of the gatekeepers' preferences were single-peaked, then there would be
[Vol. 79:613
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Indifference points are important to the gatekeepers, because they will
not seek an overruling of a Supreme Court decision if it is between the
legislative median and the gatekeepers' indifference point (G(M) < C <
M). Knowing they will be overruled by Congress if they introduce a bill
setting their preferences (G loses to M), the gatekeepers will simply not
introduce override legislation.
According to the assumptions of the game's designers, the President
only becomes involved when the gatekeepers seek an override and
Congress responds with override legislation. When a President is faced
with a decision of whether to veto the legislation, another salient point
arises in our game, namely, the veto median (V). The veto median is the
point that divides both legislative chambers so that a third of the mem-
bers have ideal points to the right of V and two-thirds have ideal points
to the left, or vice versa. V is obviously a strategic point of reference for
a President who does not wish to have his veto overridden. Also, since V
will lie to one side of the preferences of the median legislator, it has the
a point to the left of G that the gatekeepers like just as much as they like the position of the median





Left G(M) G M Right
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potential of increasing the range within which a Court decision could be
protected from overruling legislation.
Despite its "strong" assumptions, the positive game provides a
robust explanation for the behavior of the Court, Congress, and the
President in three periods roughly tracking those described in Part I.
The explanation, however, is not perfect. In this Part II(A), I identify
data that the positive game does not explain. Later, I introduce a varia-
tion on the model that corrects those flaws.
1. Court/Congress/President Cooperation: 1962-72
Recall that in the first period we identified, 1962-70, the preferences
of the Court and the President apparently were to the left of Congress'
preferences, and the preferences of the gatekeepers in Congress were
somewhat to the left of Congress' preferences.1 99 Figure 1 maps these
relationships linearly.2' Using these relationships as our starting point,
consider how the Court/Congress/President game plays out.
Figure 1
Civil Rights Preferences, 1962-71
1 1 I I- 4
G(M) C G M
P
For purposes of this Figure, recall the abbreviations we are using:
C = Majority of Supreme Court
G = Gatekeepers (relevant committees & majority leadership)
M = Median Member of Congress
P = President
G(M) = Gatekeepers' Indifference Point
V = Veto Median
Given this array of preferences, one expects a short and simple
game, in which the Court merely reads its preferences into civil rights
statutes. This is our expectation, because the Court makes the first move
199. The House and Senate leadership-Speaker McCormack (D-Mass.) and Majority Leader
Mansfield (D-Mont.) through most of this period-was decidedly in line with the preferences of
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and to the left of President Nixon's. The House Judiciary
Committee (chaired by Representative Celler (D-N.Y.)) and Education and Labor Committee
(chaired by Representative Perkins (D-Ky.)) were more liberal than the House median on both the
Democratic and Republican sides. The same was not true of the Senate Judiciary Committee
(chaired by Senator Eastland (D-Miss.)), which was to the right of the Senate median. The Senate
Labor and Public Welfare Committee (although chaired by Senator Hill (D-Ala.) until 1969) was to
the left of the Senate median. See supra notes 27 & 25.
200. With some alterations as to terminology, the figures in this Part are adapted from Ferejohn
& Shipan, supra note 194.
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and wants to interpret the statute as closely as possible to its own prefer-
ences (C) without being overruled by Congress. Figure 1 suggests that
the Court can impose its own preferences in this manner, because the
gatekeepers have no incentive to introduce override legislation. The
gatekeepers have no incentive because if they did introduce override leg-
islation to implement their preferences (G), Congress would simply
implement its own preferences (M). Since the gatekeepers prefer the
Court's result to Congress' (G(M) < C < M), they will not introduce
override legislation.2"1
As explained above, Figure 1 describes the players' preferences dur-
ing this period. Consider how the game changes (slightly) if the Court's
position falls to the left of the gatekeepers' indifference point (that is,
C < G(M)). In that event, the Court would not want to implement its
desired policy (C), because that would stimulate the gatekeepers to pro-
pose a statute overruling its decision (since the gatekeepers prefer the
congressional median to the Court's decision). Any time the Court
implements a policy to the left of G(M), then Congress will simply
respond by enacting the overruling statute (at x = M). In such a situa-
tion, the Court's best strategy would be to compromise its own prefer-
ences and choose the gatekeepers' indifference point as its decision
(x = G(M)). In short, so long as the Court's decision falls on or to the
right of G(M) (that is, G(M) < C)-the point the gatekeepers like just as
much or more than M-the gatekeepers will not propose legislation.
Without a proposal by the gatekeepers, Congress will have nothing to act
upon. With no act from Congress, the President does not play in the
game.
Hence, under Figure 1 and simple variations, the Court can make
any decision (x) in the interval JG(M), MI and not be overruled by
Congress. In general, the Court will choose as its decision either its pre-
ferred point or the gatekeepers' indifference point, whichever is further to
the right (x = max IC, G(M) J). Note that I have drawn Figure 1 so
that the Court's preferred point (C) is to the right of G(M). Thus, on
issues for which this is the correct configuration, the Court will simply
adopt its preferred point (C) as its final decision. I think this preferred
point is where the Court actually was for most civil rights issues in the
period 1962 to 1972-to the left of Congress generally, and usually to the
left of the gatekeepers as well, but not so far to the left that it provoked
legislative overruling.
The game in Figure 1 predicts that the Court would be able to inter-
pret civil rights statutes more liberally than Congress or even its gate-
201. For the simple game in Figure 1, we do not assign a major role to the President. But note
that the President would not always be able to protect the Court through a veto in the situation
described in Figure 1.
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keepers would have wanted during this period, without risking a
legislative overruling so long as the Court's decision was not to the left of
the gatekeepers' indifference point (G(M)). This game suggests a Court
with a great deal of policy influence-a Court able to steer civil rights
policy significantly to the left of what Congress desired.202 The game just
described does in fact capture much of what occurred during the period
of 1962 to 1972: The Court's decisions interpreting civil rights statutes
were in some cases to the left of decisions that Congress itself would have
made, yet Congress overruled none of them, in part because the gate-
keepers refused to initiate overruling proposals.
The best example of the positive game in action involves Jones v.
Mayer. Jones reinterpreted section 1982 to create a substantially more
liberal remedy for race discrimination in housing than Congress had been
willing to create, just weeks before, in title VIII.2 °3 The Court's decision
probably represented a more liberal remedy than that favored by the
median Member of Congress. Nevertheless, there was no effort to over-
rule Jones v. Mayer. Indeed, there probably were no such proposals
because the House gatekeepers-the Democratic Leadership and the
Judiciary Committee-preferred the Court's decision to the compromise
solution reached by Congress in title VIII.2 4
Following the Jones decision, lower federal courts began to apply its
reasoning to section 1981 cases involving claims of employment discrimi-
nation.20 5 Had it been asked to decide if section 1981 applied in these
instances, Congress probably would have balked, since section 1981 pro-
cedures and remedies (including punitive damages) were quite liberal.
202. If we included the President in this game (as I do below for the last period, 1981-90), the
Court's ability to move civil rights policy to the left would be even more pronounced. During most
of the period 1962-72, the President was aligned with the Court and could be expected to veto any
effort by Congress to overrule the Court. In such cases, the relevant preference becomes either the
gatekeepers' indifference point (G(M)) or the veto median (V), whichever is further to the left. This
would allow the Court to implement its own policy in some cases where C < G(M).
203. Title VIII covered discrimination in transactions involving residential realty alone, while
section 1982 as interpreted in Jones v. Mayer covered business and personal property as well. Title
VIII was administratively enforced through a gradual phased-in process, but Jones v. Mayer
immediately activated a private right of action. Title VIII contained a number of exemptions in
order to procure Republican support (for example, religious institutions, small boardinghouses),
none of which pertained to newly interpreted section 1982.
204. The year after Jones v. Mayer, the House Judiciary Committee was chaired by the very
liberal Emanuel Celler, who prided himself above all on his sponsorship of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The Committee consisted of 15 liberal Democrats, 5 southern Democrats, and 15
Republicans, of whom 5 were liberal eastern Republicans and another 4 were midwestern moderate
conservatives who strongly supported civil rights legislation. See 1969 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 66
(listing Committee membership). Celler, the chair of the Committee, would have stalled any bill to
overrule Jones v. Mayer. Moreover, even if the bill could have gotten to a Committee vote, it would
have only received between eleven and fifteen of the thirty-five votes on the Committee.
205. See C. ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 265-76 (1980) (collecting
cases).
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Indeed, they were much more liberal than those Congress had adopted
(as a compromise to end the Senate filibuster) in title VII. When it came
time to reexamine title VII, the congressional gatekeepers refused to pro-
pose that the parallel section 1981 cause of action be curtailed or elimi-
nated by title VII. However, amendments to overrule the section 1981
cases were made in both chambers. A majority of Senators present
favored the Senate amendment, but it failed on a tie vote because of
maneuvering by the Senate leadership. 06 The House amendment was
rejected in committee but adopted by a narrow vote on the House
floor.20 7 The House conferees-members of the gatekeeping committee
that had rejected the proposal-predictably abandoned it in
conference.20 8
Following Jones v. Mayer, the gatekeepers in Congress were able to
use their institutional position to protect judicial decisions expanding
Jones-a result they preferred to the congressional overrides that would
have otherwise occurred. This example illustrates the various opportuni-
ties gatekeepers have to head off overruling proposals. The Court/
Congress/President game explains this behavior fairly well. It also
explains the gatekeepers' eagerness to write committee reports endorsing
the Court's results in cases like Allen and Griggs, which the gatekeepers
(more liberal than the median member in this initial period) preferred
over results that Congress would have provided.
What the Court/Congress/President game does not explain as well
is Congress' willingness to codify decisions like United States v. Guest 209
and Louisiana v. United States. 2 10 These liberal decisions represented
highly dynamic interpretations of the 1870 Act. Not only did Congress
fail to overrule the decisions, but it also ultimately went along with the
suggestion made by both the Court and the gatekeepers that new and
more expansive statutes be enacted to protect civil rights workers and
voting rights. The positive political theory model would suggest that in
these circumstances, Congress must have agreed with those decisions
(C = M, not C < M), Although this scenario can neither be proved nor
206. The recorded vote was 33-33, which meant the defeat of the amendment. But there was a
34th Senator on the floor, Senator Gambrell (D-Ga.), who announced that he favored the
amendment but was a "live pair" with an absent Senator opposed to the amendment. See 118 CONG.
REc. 3372-73 (1972). This was very unusual: a Senator will rarely be in a live pair when doing so
would affect the outcome. Apparently the Democratic leadership had made some special deal with
Senator Gambrell.
207. 117 CONG. REC. 32,111 (1971).
208. Of the 20 Representatives named to the conference by the House leadership, see 118 CONG.
REc. 5187 (1972), 11 (all but one of the Democrats) had voted against the amendment, see 117
CONG. REC. 32111 (1971).
209. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
210. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
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disproved, I am doubtful that it represents the entire story. I present
another explanation in Part II(B).
2. Court/Congress Conflict: 1972-81
Between 1971 and 1975, a dramatic change in institutional align-
ments occurred as the Court shifted to the right of Congress. For many
issues, the shift yielded the configuration described in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Civil Rights Preferences, 1972-81
I ! II
G(M) G M C
P
That is, the Court's preferences (C) were often to the right of the prefer-
ences of Congress (M), while the gatekeepers' preferences (G) remained
slightly to the left of those of the median member. The President's pref-
erences (P) moved closer to the congressional median during this period
but were often to the left of that median.2"
The dynamics of the institutional interactions are simpler in this sec-
ond period. Under this new configuration (Figure 2), if the Court imple-
ments its own preferences (C) through interpretation of the civil rights
statutes, it will be overridden, because the gatekeepers will have an incen-
tive to introduce overruling legislation (they prefer any x < C, and the
ultimate result M < C), and Congress will vote for its preferred outcome
over that of the Court (it prefers M to C). As a result, the Court has a
strong incentive to compromise its preferences and reach results that are
at or to the left of the congressional median (M). Interestingly, because
the Court's preferences are on the other side of the congressional median
from the gatekeepers' preferences, the Court has lost much of its discre-
tion to reach a result at variance with the median congressional prefer-
ence (M) and, as a consequence, the Court runs a much greater risk of
being overruled.
This Court/Congress/President game captures nicely much of what
went on in the 1970s. A good example is the Supreme Court's decision
in Runyon v. McCrary.212 Runyon affirmed the application of Jones v.
Mayer's interpretation of section 1982 (discrimination in property trans-
actions) to section 1981 (contract transactions). The Court's willingness
211. The Presidents during the 1970s held preferences not far from those of the median
member. Because the Office of Civil Rights remained strongly to the left of M during this period, the
administrations were on the whole at M or to the left of M and were, therefore, of no consequence in
the game. The story changes substantially in the 1980s, as Part II(A)(3) will reveal.
212. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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to extend the Jones reasoning here, by a seven-to-two vote, was explicitly
premised upon the Court's belief that Congress, in 1971-72, had
approved of the application of Jones v. Mayer to section 1981 cases.213
Moreover, two of the seven majority Justices wrote concurring opinions
suggesting that they thought Jones v. Mayer was in fact wrongly decided
but that stare decisis, reinforced by current legislative policy, impelled
them to go along with a liberal interpretation of section 1981.214 A third
Justice in the majority probably would have voted with the dissenters if
the Court had split four-to-four.21 5 Runyon is the rare case in which the
Court all but announces that it is voting against its preferences in order
to accommodate the preferences of the current Congress.
A number of other Burger Court decisions in the late 1970s relied
on the Court's perception of legislative preferences to reach results that
appeared more liberal than the Court's own preferences.216 Indeed, the
Court/Congress/President game provides an interesting explanation for
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 217 which interpreted title VII to allow vol-
untary affirmative action. Justice Stewart, who voted with the Weber
majority, had voted the year before against the constitutionality of volun-
tary state affirmative action.2"' Another majority Justice explained his
vote in Weber as a response to societal developments that had overtaken
the original congressional expectations.219 Both these Justices may have
been sensitive to the pressures for affirmative action created by Griggs v.
213. Id. at 174-75 & n.11. I argue that the Court was mistaken, in Eskridge, Interpreting
Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. Rv. 67 (1988).
214. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 186-89 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 189-92 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
215. The third Justice was Chief Justice Burger, who held preferences to the right of Justice
Stevens, and who was notorious for voting against his preferences so that he could assign the
majority opinion.
216. For the most prominent examples, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 685-
87, 694-708 (1979) (Court split 5-1-3, with the bare majority opinion resting on the apparent
congressional assumption that title IX included a private cause of action); Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-701 (1978) (7-2 split Court relies upon recent legislative assumptions
in overruling line of section 1983 cases); United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131-34
(1978) (5-1-3 split Court endorses liberal interpretation of Voting Rights Act, based in part on
congressional understandings when Act was renewed in 1975); id. at 138-39 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (more strongly stated reliance on subsequent legislative understandings); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (5-1-2 split Court allowing affirmative remedies in title
VII cases and relying in part on discussions underlying 1972 amendments). On the other hand, this
sort of argument failed in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977).
217. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
218. Justice Stewart, the necessary fifth vote in Weber (the Court split 5-2), was part of the five-
Justice majority invalidating the affirmative action plan in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justices Stevens and Powell, who did not participate in Weber, were
also part of the Bakke majority.
219. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Duke Power Co. 220 and to the gatekeeping committees' approval of
Griggs in 1972. For these reasons, a Court critical of affirmative action in
constitutional cases ended up interpreting title VII to allow a broad
range of private affirmative action programs. 221 The conclusion from
this Weber example suggests a broader observation: The Burger Court
generally produced results in constitutional civil rights cases (where
there was little chance of its being overridden) that were discernibly more
conservative than the results it reached in analogous cases of statutory
interpretation.222
If the positive political theory model's predictions were correct-
namely, that the more conservative Court in the 1970s was often willing
to subordinate its preferences to avoid being overruled-then Gilbert,
McMann, City of Mobile v. Bolden, and Atascadero223 were anomalies,
because these decisions by a bitterly divided Court were overridden by an
outraged Congress. The positive political theory model would view the
overrides as instances where the game did not achieve perfect equilib-
rium, perhaps because of a failure of one or more assumptions. For the
Court to avoid an override under the conditions of Figure 2, it must be
able to predict accurately the views of the median Member of Congress.
There is little room for error (unlike under the conditions of Figure 1).
In Gilbert, McMann, and Bolden, the Court may have misjudged the
location of M-placing it further to the right than the actual M-and
suffered the consequences, namely, legislative overrides. This is a plausi-
ble explanation, 224 albeit one marred by the Court's substantial mis-
220. 401 U.S. 424 (1972).
221. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), confirmed this broad approval.
The Johnson majority, formed when the Court was even more conservative, explicitly relied on
current congressional preferences to expand on Weber. Id. at 629 n.7; see also id. at 642-47 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
222. Contrast the Burger Court's broad tolerance of voluntary affirmative action in statutory
interpretation cases like Weber and Johnson with its more critical attitude in constitutional cases like
Bakke, Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), and Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986). Contrast the Burger Court's willingness to look at effects
upon racial groups to find actionable "discrimination" in statutory cases like Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), and Griggs, with its focus on only intentional conduct to find
"discrimination" in constitutional cases like Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 75-120.
224. The Court's subsequent willingness to follow the liberal dictates of the overrides and not
just their bare text supports this explanation somewhat. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986) (divided Court applies Voting Rights Amendments of 1982 very liberally); Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (7-2 divided Court holds that
Pregnancy Discrimination Act not only overruled holding of Gilbert, but also discredited its whole
approach to gender discrimination). Congressional overrides of the Court's pregnancy
discrimination and minority vote dilution opinions taught the Court much about the median
member's preferences (M). As a consequence, the Court was able to stay out of trouble in later
cases.
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perceptions in each case."' In Part II(B), I present an alternativeexplanation.
3. Court/Congress/President Confrontation: 1981-90
In the final period, the President becomes a major player in the
game. In the 1980s, the Court moved somewhat further to the right of
Congress (especially after 1986, when the Court moved sharply to the
right and Congress to the left). The decade's biggest shift, however, was
the significant movement to the right by the Presidency. Figure 3 maps
out the new preference configuration.
Figure 3
Civil Rights Preferences, 1981-90
I I .. .. ..
G(M) G M V C
P
Recall that V is the veto median, or the point that divides the legis-
lative chamber such that a third of the members have ideal points to the
right of V and two-thirds have ideal points to the left. Figure 3 places
the Court (C) and the Presidency (P) to the right of this veto point
(C > V; P > V) for the main cases from this period discussed in Part I.
However, I believe that the Court was to the left of the veto median (C
< V) for many civil rights issues during this period. The administra-
tion's position, though, remains further to the right (V < P) for some of
these issues.
Under this version of the Court/Congress/President game, the
Court will not want to implement its own preferences when they are to
the right of the veto median (C > V), because that decision would stimu-
late the gatekeepers to introduce overruling legislation set at V. Such
legislation would not only be approved by Congress but also would sur-
vive an expected veto. Hence, the Court would want to shoot for a deci-
sion close to or to the left of the veto median (V). Although the
gatekeepers would dislike that result, they would not introduce overrul-
ing legislation because they would realize that it would be vetoed and
that they could not get Congress to override the veto. For this reason,
they would live with V.
The game depicted in Figure 3 gives the conservative Court much
more discretion than it had in Figure 2, because the addition of a presi-
dential veto protects the Court's decisions against overrides. Hence, we
225. In McMann, for example, the Court was aware of the Senate committee report endorsing
the Fourth Circuit's decision the Court was reversing. While the Court's vote in McMann was
probably taken before the committee report was promulgated, Justices have been known to change
their votes during the deliberative process.
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would expect the Court's interpretation of civil rights statutes to have
shifted markedly to the right in the 1980s-even more to the right than
we might otherwise have expected simply from the rightward personnel
changes. This scenario is basically what we find. The Court's composi-
tion changed only once between 1975 and 1986 (conservative Justice
O'Connor replacing moderately conservative Justice Stewart). However,
the Court's interpretations of civil rights statutes shifted dramatically to
the right after 1981, when the Presidency emerged as a potential protec-
tion for the Court's conservative preferences.226 The few liberal interpre-
tations of civil rights statutes that occurred in this period tended to
emphasize recent legislative signals,227 suggesting that perhaps a few
Justices were being careful to avoid results too far to the right, lest they
fall athwart the veto median (V).
To see how this dynamic operates, consider the Court's position on
the issue of tax exemptions for private institutions that segregate on the
basis of race. Here, the positive political theory model offers a particu-
larly good explanation for the Court's curious approach. Responding to
lower court challenges, the Internal Revenue Service in 1970-71 amended
its regulations to disallow income tax exemptions to racially discrimina-
tory private schools.228 Although the Code and its legislative history did
not strongly support the Service's position, Congress in the 1970s turned
back all efforts to reverse the new rules. It did, however, hamper the
agency's efforts to devote substantial resources to the regulation's
226. See, eg., Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (6-3 split Court narrowly construes § 1988);
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (6-3 split Court narrowly construes Education of All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and Rehabilitation Act); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S.
555 (1984) (6-3 split Court narrowly construes title IX); Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax
Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (4-1-4 split
Court extends liberal PDA interpretation to insurance companies but does so only prospectively);
City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983) (5-3 split Court narrowly construes Voting
Rights Act); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (6-1-2 split
Court narrowly interprets section 1981); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982) (5-
4 split Court broadly construes exception to title VII); City of Memphis v. Green, 451 U.S. 100
(1981) (6-3 split Court narrowly interprets section 1982). But see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440
(1982) (Connecticut state agency's promotion of a greater overall percentage of black employees
than of white employees did not preclude black employee plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie
case of disparate impact under title VII); County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981)
(Bennett amendment to title VII does not restrict title VII prohibition of sex-based wage
discrimination to equal pay for equal work claims).
227. See, eg., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987) (5-1-3 split
Court relies on subsequent congressional approval of Weber to reaffirm its view of title VII); School
Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277-80 (1987) (7-2 split Court relies on congressional review of HEW
regulations to interpret Rehabilitation Act); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530-35
(1982) (6-3 split Court relying on legislative review and deliberation over proposed HEW
regulations).
228. The IRS policy was approved in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd
mem., 404 U.S. 997 (1971), and formalized in Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
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enforcement.22 9 The Supreme Court's treatment of this issue tracks the
well-publicized congressional treatment. In Bob Jones University v.
United States, 230 a virtually unanimous Court upheld the agency regula-
tion, relying heavily on Congress' supportive stance in the 1970s.2 3 1 But
a year later, in Allen v. Wright, a divided Court refused to allow citizens
to enforce the agency regulations directly. 32
Despite this success, the positive political theory model does not
explain two important anomalies from this last period: the surprising
amount and intensity of conflict between the Court/President and
Congress; and the failure of each to avoid being reversed. The Court's
interpretations were reversed five times after 1985 (with another nine vul-
nerable in the current Congress). The President's veto was overridden
once. And Congress' action was thwarted once by a successful veto. The
positive political theory model might attribute these reversals to
insufficient information as to the location of the veto median (V). That
explanation, however, is problematic. Why should the Court and
President make such big mistakes in this period and not in earlier ones?
Why should Congress have made the same mistake in 1990? This phe-
nomenon is the biggest anomaly facing the positive political theory
model as applied here, and it requires us to supplement the model.
B. Supplementing the Positive Political Theory Model: Informational
Features of the Court/Congress/President Game
The game I have been using to model the Court/Congress/President
interaction over the interpretation of civil rights statutes emphasizes the
"distributive" features of the legislative process.233 The positive political
theory model assumes that Congress delegates duties to committees and
outside agents (like courts) in ways that serve its members' reelection
goals. Hence, the role of committees is to distribute rents to those mem-
bers (and their constituents) who most intensely want them, and the role
of agents is to carry out the members' current policies. Politics is seen as
229. For example, in 1978-79 the IRS issued regulations placing burdens on schools with low
percentages of black students to "prove" nondiscrimination. Congress subsequently passed the
Ashbrook Amendment, which barred the IRS from implementing those regulations. Other "back
door" restrictions followed. See IRS Tax Exemptions and Segregated Private Schools: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1982).
230. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
231. Id. at 599-602; see also id. at 607 (Powell, J., concurring).
232. 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984). The 5-3 Court held that parents of black children did not have
"standing" to sue for enforcement of the IRS regulation. Id. at 740. Read in conjunction with the
Bob Jones ruling, Wright indicates that the Court shares congressional sentiment: The formal IRS
rule stands, but enforcement will be lax.
233. See M. FIORINA, supra note 192; D. MAYHEW, supra note 192; K. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT
JIGSAW PUZZLE (1978).
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a zero-sum game,. in which Congress and its members scheme to divide
up the pie, with minimal friction and not much attention to what is
"good" policy. Equilibrium means stable outcomes in which the various
players operate under perfect information to satisfy their preferences
(and those of important interest groups). Operating from these distribu-
tive assumptions, the model generates some intuitively appealing insights
about civil rights overrides, but leaves several anomalies insufficiently
explained, most notably the spate of legislative overrides and conflict in
the past six years.
Several positive political theorists, most notably Professors Thomas
Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, have suggested that distributive features do
not account for what goes on in the legislative process, and that informa-
tional features of the process deserve emphasis. 34 Under this view, legis-
lators are policy outcome-oriented, as well as reelection-oriented, but are
uncertain which policies produce desired outcomes. The legislature deals
with uncertainty by delegating information-gathering and consensus-
creating roles to committees and other agents. Under these assumptions,
equilibrium is not rent-seeking stability: instead, it means a continuous
exchange of information and views within committees and between the
chamber and its committees until sufficient certainty finally allows the
legislature to set policy.
These positive political theorists do not claim that informational
assumptions explain all the data on the operation of Congress. They do
claim, however, that distributive assumptions do not explain it either,
and my case study bears this out. These theorists make an important
advance by suggesting that in our game, the players' preferences are not
entirely "exogenous," that is, determined prior to playing the game. To a
substantial extent, they are "endogenous," formed in the process of play-
ing the game and in response to the information and arguments adduced
by the other players. This also suggests that there is no single Court/
Congress/President game, but rather a series of games in which commit-
tees and agents have incentives to build up credibility by moving toward
the legislative median (M). Reconsider our three periods of political
interaction in light of the additional possibilities offered by considering
the informational role of the players.
L Court/Congress/President Cooperation: 1962-72
Informational assumptions provide a different way of thinking about
234. See K. KREHBIEL, supra note 192; Gilligan & Krehbiel, Organization of Informative
Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 AM. J. POL. Sc. 531 (1990); Gilligan & Krehbiel,
Collective Choice Without Procedural Commitment, in MODELS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE IN POLITICS
295 (P. Ordeshook ed. 1989); T. Gilligan, Performance of an Institutionalized Legislature (1989-90)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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the initial period of cooperation among the Court, Congress, and the
President on matters of civil rights policy (recall Figure 1). At the
game's beginning, the views of Congress (M) and the gatekeepers (G) are
incompletely formed, and open to change based upon more information.
The Court's decision interpreting a civil rights statute (C) consequently
becomes relevant information that might be considered, first, by the gate-
keepers and, then, by the entire Congress. Three outcomes are possible,
given the initial (and now only tentative) preference mapping for this
period in Figure 1.
The first possible outcome I call the "information variation." Under
this outcome, the relevant committees will examine the facts and reason-
ing of the Court's decision and agree with it. If the committee agrees
with the decision, obviously it does not have to do anything. Moreover,
sometimes the committee will even use the decision as a building block
for new statutory initiatives. For example, the judiciary committees fol-
lowed this course in using Allen v. State Board of Elections as a founda-
tion for their thinking during the 1970 reenactment of the Voting Rights
Act; the labor committees did the same when they considered Griggs
similarly in the context of title VII's 1972 amendment. When the
Court's opinion itself calls for legislative action to build upon its opinion,
as in Guest, the committees will be particularly likely to press for codify-
ing legislation.
The second possible outcome is the "distributive variation" dis-
cussed above: The gatekeeping committees will not agree with the
Court's decision, but will not take action to overrule it because they do
not prefer the decision Congress would probably adopt. Notwithstand-
ing informational features of the political process, distributive features
remain strong possibilities for the Court/Congress/President game.z35
Indeed, the distributive variation remains a robust positive political
explanation of Congress' failure to overrule Jones v. Mayer.
The third possible outcome is a hybrid of the first two: The
gatekeeping committees will be persuaded by the Court's decision and
will shift their preferences (G) in the direction of the Court's (C); how-
ever, they will not initiate statutory proposals to codify or build upon the
235. Information theorists might argue, first, that this will occur in a narrow range of cases,
because the preferences of committees (G) will not be far from those of the median Member (M).
These theorists argue that committees are generally not composed of preference "outliers," and I
think they are largely correct. However, even their own evidence suggests that the Labor and
Judiciary committees in the 1980s were more liberal than the median Member.
Information theorists would argue, second, that the relevant committees are not gatekeepers,
because they cannot prevent Congress from considering issues. There is much to this argument. In
all the case examples I have discussed for this period, Congress had its chance to vote. But I
consider the gatekeepers to be the committees plus the Democratic leadership, which together do
substantially control the agenda of Congress and did play a critical role, for example, in turning back
the floor challenges to the Jones v. Mayer interpretation in 1971-72.
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Court's decision because they are unsure that Congress will agree (they
are not sure M will shift toward C). This is a plausible explanation of the
congressional response to Griggs: The very liberal labor committees in
both chambers were persuaded by the Griggs opinion (and wrote com-
mittee reports to that effect) but never sought to codify it in title VII,
since they were not certain that Congress would be similarly persuaded.
2. Court/Congress Conflict: 1972-81
Informational assumptions also provide a different way of looking at
our second period, in which the Court's rightward shift yielded a number
of overrides. The Court as an institution was trying to do more than just
accommodate its preferences to those of Congress. Sometimes the Court
was trying to change congressional preferences through persuasive opin-
ions. Under this more complex set of assumptions, there are again three
types of outcomes that might flow from the tentative preference map-
pings in Figure 2.
Under one possible outcome-the information variation-the Court
will stick to its preferences and try to persuade the gatekeepers and
Congress of its views. This is a very hard task, since it is especially
important to persuade the gatekeepers, whose preferences (G) are more
distant from the Court's (C) than Congress' () are. This scenario
appears to be the one that the Court tried to follow in Gilbert, Bolden,
and Atascadero. All three opinions were based upon the Court's con-
servative constitutional jurisprudence-fourteenth amendment gender
discrimination, fifteenth amendment voting rights, and eleventh amend-
ment state sovereign immunity, respectively-and might be interpreted
as extensions of that jurisprudence. In these opinions, therefore, the
Court was informing Congress of an important body of constitutional
law and suggesting that the statutory law should run along parallel lines.
Even though Congress declined to follow the Court's lead in each case, it
did so only after considering the gatekeepers' thorough factfinding and
reports, which discredited the Court's analysis.
Under the second possibility-the distributive variation-the Court
will adjust its preferences in deference to those of the legislature and will
successfully avoid an override. I think this is precisely what the Court
did explicitly in Runyon and implicitly in Weber and a number of other
civil rights decisions of the 1970s.236 The distributive variation would
explain cases like Gilbert by suggesting that the Court was simply mis-
taken about the congressional median. This conclusion strikes me as also
plausible.
A third possible outcome, something of a hybrid, is that the Court
236. See cases cited supra note 216.
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will signal Congress that its policy preferences might be different from its
institutional preferences, thereby inviting a legislative override. This, I
believe, is what the Court was doing in Alyeska Pipeline. The Court
understood that, as a matter of policy, fee shifting made sense in public
law litigation. The Court, however, did not feel comfortable adopting
this fee shifting, in light of two factors: the relative clarity of the statutes
limiting a court's authority to award counsel fees to the prevailing party
and Congress' repeated willingness-in the 1960s and early 1970s-to
adopt specific fee-shifting statutes tailored to specific statutory schemes
when it wanted them. The Court's opinion provided Congress with use-
ful information, and openly invited an override, to do what the Court felt
incapable of doing.
3. Court/Congress/President Conflict: 1981-90
Informational assumptions also provide a useful perspective for
thinking about our third period, in which a strong rightward shift in the
Presidency not only supported the expected rightward shift in the
Supreme Court opinions, but also ultimately contributed to four years of
unprecedented conflict between the Court/President, on one side, and
Congress, on the other. Again, these assumptions expand the possible
outcomes of this revised game, in which the President became a major
player in trying to protect the Court from Congress-especially after
1986, when Congress moved to the left and the Court sharply to the right
(recall Figure 3).
One possible outcome is an information variation. The Court will
implement its preferences as the decision (x = C) but will write an opin-
ion providing Congress with useful information, in hopes of persuading
enough Members of Congress to shift the veto median (V) to the right.
The Court may have taken this attitude in Grove City and Betts, both of
which proved dramatically unpersuasive to large majorities in Congress.
Interestingly, the Court was probably trying to do this in Wards Cove,
Martin v. Wilks, and Zipes, three of the six 1989 decisions subject to the
1990 civil rights bill.
In each of these opinions, the Court articulated important policy
concerns that might have moved the veto median. Wards Cove and
Martin reflected the Court's concern that the dynamics of title VII
actions gave employers perverse incentives to adopt racial quotas. As a
result, the Court in Wards Cove made plaintiffs' burden of proof in dispa-
rate impact cases more demanding to ensure that employers were not
pressured to shoot for completely "proportional representation" by
minorities, as through quotas.237 The Court in Martin v. Wilks relied on
237. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 652 (criticizing lower court's Griggs-based approach on the
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standard due process values to assure procedural avenues for future
white employees to reopen consent decrees to make "reverse discrimina-
tion" claims.23 This is also a plausible explanation for Zipes, where the
Court was concerned about the rights of intervening defendants.2 39 That
the President's veto of the 1990 civil rights bill was not overridden might
suggest that the Court was successful in moving the veto median on these
issues, thlough I think the third variation, described below, offers an even
better explanation.
Another possible outcome is suggested by the distributive variation
set forth initially: Even though the Court's decision is to the right of the
preferences of Congress, it will try to avoid an override, by moving its
own preferences toward what the Court perceives to be the veto median.
This move does indeed explain most of the cases and suggests that some
of the congressional overrides may have been a result of the Court's mis-
calculation of the veto median. For example, Patterson was clearly a
compromise decision, in which the five-Justice majority reaffirmed
Runyon v. McCrary as "consistent with our society's deep commitment
to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's race,""24 but
then interpreted Runyon rather narrowly, based in part on its clash with
the original assumptions of title VII.21? Such a decision at least seemed
to signal an accommodating attitude toward current legislative prefer-
ences.242 Much the same story can be told for Smith v. Robinson,
Paralyzed Veterans of America, and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 243 On
the other hand, this game does not adequately explain Grove City, Betts,
and probably some of the 1989 decisions currently being considered for
override by Congress (such as Lorance), where the Court's miscalcula-
tions were quite substantial.
A third possible outcome, a hybrid of the informational and distrib-
grounds that it would impel "many employers... to adopt racial quotas," in violation of section
703()).
238. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 761, 762 n.2 (ironically relying on Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 40 (1940), which allowed a collateral challenge to a decree segregating a Chicago
neighborhood).
239. See Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 761-66 (1989).
240. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989).
241. Id. at 177-82.
242. Members of Congress took the unusual step of filing an amicus brief in Patterson. The brief
argued only for reaffirming Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); it did not tackle the difficult
issue of applying Runyon to Patterson's facts. See Brief of 66 Members of the United States Senate
and 118 Members of the United States House of Representatives as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Patterson (No. 87-107). In light of this brief, the Patterson opinion may be seen as
responding to congressional concerns, or at least to the Court's understanding of those concerns.
243. After being overridden three times in 1986 in its interpretations of statutes affecting the
handicapped, see Department of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), the
Court changed course the next year by broadly construing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in
School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
[Vol. 79:613
HeinOnline  -- 79 Cal. L. Rev. 660 1991
CIVIL RIGHTS GAME
utive variations, is that the Court will write an opinion trying to shift the
veto median to the right, and the gatekeepers will respond bymounting
an effort to shift the veto median to the left. The gatekeepers appear to
have done just this in 1988 with the Restoration Act. The Act not only
overruled Grove City's interpretation of title IX, but went beyond the
position of the Grove City dissenters and expanded federal antidis-
crimination rules to entire "systems."'  Seeking to repeat their 1988
success, the gatekeepers tried to do the same thing in 1990. The Court's
decisions in the six 1989 cases-Wards Cove, Martin v. Wilks, Patterson,
Hopkins, Lorance, Zipes-were extremely vulnerable in Congress
because its policy preferences were too far to the right and so bereft of
persuasive power that even the President deserted the Court on Patterson
and Lorance.
As a result, the gatekeepers could have drafted a bill overruling
most of these decisions (probably all but Ward's Cove) at the veto median
(V) and could have been successful. But from the gatekeepers' point of
view, such a decision (x = V) would have been little better than the
Court's decisions (x = C > V). Hence, the gatekeepers themselves
sought to move the veto median (V) and the median member () to the
left on some of the relevant issues (especially the Wards Cove issue)
through extensive hearings detailing the unfortunate practical effects of
the decisions on civil rights enforcement. The 1990 experience suggests
that the gatekeepers did not move the veto median far enough to the left
(the veto was not overridden). But it also suggests that a less ambitious
bill introduced to the current Congress could pass, because most of the
Court's decisions appear to be to the right of the veto median.
C. Positive Predictions for Court/Congress/President Interaction on
Civil Rights Issues in the 1990s
Positive political analysis not only provides explanations about the
past but can suggest the direction of future Court/Congress/President
interaction regarding civil rights statutes. One prediction is that
Congress in 1991 or 1992 ought to be able to enact legislation overruling
most or all of the nine Supreme Court decisions subject to the vetoed
1990 bill. The main obstacle to an override is not the prospect of another
presidential veto, but the possible failure of the gatekeepers to develop a
bill tailored to the veto median (yielding a bill the President would ordi-
244. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1985: Joint Hearings on H.R. 700 Before the House
Comm. on Education and Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 174, 404-05, 599 (1985) (statements of Rep.
Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.)). Rep. Sensenbrenner believed Grove City was wrongly decided and
supported both bills but felt that the 1985 bill did more than overrule Grove City. See also id. at 231-
36 (similar testimony by Assistant Attorney General Reynolds).
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narily not veto, whatever his own preferences). For example, a bill over-
ruling Patterson and Lorance (which the administration supported in
1990) could pass without a veto. A bill also overruling Hopkins, Zipes,
and the three minor pre-1989 cases245 could probably pass with veto-
proof margins. With larger Democratic majorities in Congress, the gate-
keepers also ought to be able to pass a bill modifying Wards Cove and
Martin v. Wilks.
The more interesting question is what the dynamics for Court/
Congress/President interaction will be for future Supreme Court deci-
sions interpreting civil rights statutes. The dynamics are, I think, fairly
established for the 1990s: The Court's preferences will remain to the
right of Congress' preferences which in turn will be to the right of the
preferences of the majority leadership and one of the two gatekeeping
committees (the labor committees).246 The three variables that will be
important for the dynamics under the Court/Congress/President civil
rights game developed in this Part are the preferences of the Presidency,
the strategy of the Court, and the strategy of the gatekeepers. Consider
some of the variations.
One possible (and in my view likely) scenario is a reduction of open
Court/Congress conffict (after the 1991/92 bill is passed), even though
the Court's own preferences will probably drift to the right, at least in the
early 1990s.24 7 The key variable will be whether the Court decides to
compromise its preferences as it did in most of the civil rights cases of the
245. See cases cited supra note 15.
246. I assume here that the Democrats will retain their majorities in Congress, which seems
very probable for the House and probable for the Senate. If so, Congress will remain substantially to
the left of the Court, whose left-leaning Justices are relatively older than the right-leaning Justices
(and hence more likely to be replaced). Even if the Republicans take control of the Senate, Congress
as a whole will remain to the left of the Court on most civil rights issues.
If the Democrats retain their control of Congress, the majority leadership will likely remain to
the left of the chamber median, as is currently the case with Majority Leader Mitchell (D-Me., 1988
ADA score 95) and Speaker Foley (D-Wash., 1988 ADA score 85). If the Republicans take control
of Congress, the majority leadership will shift to the right of the chamber median, as is currently the
case with House Minority Leader Michel (R-Ill., 1988 ADA score 10) and Senate Minority Leader
Dole (R-Kan., 1988 ADA score 15). See THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1990, supra note
52 (listing the members' ADA scores).
Whichever party controls Congress, the labor committees will probably remain significantly to
the left of the chamber median; the judiciary committees will probably stay pretty much at the
chamber median (as has historically been the case). See K. KREHBIEL, supra note 192, ch. 4
(discussing House committees). For example, the 1990 Senate Judiciary Committee's Democratic
members had an average 1988 ADA score of 74; its Republican members, 15. The two scores of 74
and 15 mirrored the chamber medians of 72 and 19, respectively. However, the average scores on
the 1990 Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee differed significantly from these chamber
medians. Democratic members had average 1988 ADA scores of 88, and its Republican members,
26. These numbers are markedly higher than the chamber medians, as listed above. See THE
ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1990, supra note 52, for these ADA scores.
247. Liberal Justice Brennan's replacement by Justice Souter, who is probably more
conservative, accounts for this rightward shift. Other moderate-to-liberal Justices (Marshall,
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1970s. In the short term (with a conservative President), the Court only
has to aim at the veto median (V). This strategy will still permit the
Court plenty of discretion to reach conservative results. In the longer
term, depending on the future preferences of the Presidency, the Court
may have to aim at the congressional median (M) in order to accommo-
date the political system and avoid overrides.
The Court has strong incentives to follow this course under the
Court/Congress/President civil rights game outlined here. Under the
distributive variation, the Court's incentive to accommodate its prefer-
ences is simply to avoid being overridden. Under the information varia-
tion, the Court might want to risk being overridden in order to persuade
Congress that the Court's policy is better. In that event, the Court still
has an incentive not to be overridden constantly. That is, if the Court
wants to be seen as generating useful information for Congress, it will
lose its credibility if Congress continually rejects its information as unre-
liable by overruling its decisions. In the past, this incentive has moti-
vated the Court to become more moderate when its policy initiatives
were rebuffed by Congress.248 On the other hand, if the Court decides to
"dig in" and continue to try to persuade Congress to accept its policies,
the Court/Congress conflict will continue into the 1990s.
Whether or not the Court/Congress conflict continues, the actual
direction of civil rights statutory policy will depend largely on the
preferences of the Presidency in the 1990s. If the Presidency remains
where it is (on the right), policy will end up somewhere around the con-
gressional veto median (x = V). This would mean greater restrictions on
statutorily permitted affirmative action, narrower interpretations of sec-
tion 1981 and other general civil rights laws, and greater procedural bur-
dens on civil rights plaintiffs. If the Presidency shifts to the left, either to
or beyond the congressional median (P < M), then the Court loses a
great deal of its discretion, and the ultimate policy decision shifts toward
the congressional median (M).
Given the Court's current preferences (C > M for the entire dec-
ade), the election of a President whose civil rights preferences are at or to
the left of Congress' preferences would clearly affect civil rights policy in
the game. At the very least, a more liberal President would remove the
veto protection for the Court, and policy would move back toward the
congressional median. More dramatically, the President's ability to per-
suade and lead opinion could move the congressional median () to the
left (as the President did in the 1960s). Such a movement would have a
substantial influence on policy, notwithstanding the Court's position.
Blackmun, Stevens) may well leave the Court in time for the Bush administration to appoint more
conservative Justices.
248. For example, see the Court's positive response to the PDA, discussed supra note 224.
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The consequences would include statutory allowance of voluntary affirm-
ative action, broader interpretations of the civil rights statutes to reach
new and unanticipated problems, and fewer procedural obstacles to civil
rights enforcement.
III
NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GAME THEORY
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT/CONGRESS/PRESIDENT
INTERACTION
The normative implications of the positive political theory model
are also of interest. The model strongly suggests that the Court is a polit-
ical actor: The Court imposes its own preferences onto civil rights stat-
utes, subject mainly to the constraints imposed by the preferences of the
current President and Congress. This positive political suggestion con-
trasts dramatically with the traditional law professor's view of the Court
as merely an agent implementing the intent of the original legislature.249
Yet the traditional view fails to account for the last thirty years of the
Court's interpretations of civil rights statutes. Virtually all the important
judicial interpretations of civil rights statutes during this period either do
not explore the original legislative intent or expectations in any meaning-
ful way,25 or else they rely on arguments about those expectations that
249. See, eg., The FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) ("[The judiciary, from the nature of its
functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution .... "); Maltz,
Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power The Case for a Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63
TUL. L. REv. 1, 13 (1988) (an intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation "embodies widely
shared, deeply embedded beliefs about the appropriate scope of legislative power"); Landes &
Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcON. 875, 877-87
(1975) (interest-group theory posits that an independent judiciary will enforce existing statutes in
accordance with the enacting legislature's intent); Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19-24 (1985) (the principle of separation of powers limits the
legitimacy of lawmaking by federal courts). But see M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
SUPREME COURT (1964) (the Supreme Court is often the agent of interest groups not represented
adequately by other institutions of government).
250. See Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854, 2860-64 (1989) (skirting
the legislative history arguments and concluding they have no relevance given the "plain statutory
language," id. at 2864); Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758-66
(1989) (interpreting title VII "in light of the competing equities that Congress normally takes into
account," id at 761, but ignoring legislative intent); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 175-85 (1989) (analysis focuses on plain meaning and precedent with only scant attention to
legislative history); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (similar); Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755 (1989) (ignoring title VII altogether); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989) (ignoring legislative intent); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-47 (1985)
(emphasizing federalism policy and ignoring legislative expectations); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) (using admittedly scant legislative history to suggest that plaintiffs' statutory
claim only duplicated their fifteenth amendment claim); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
133-40 (1976) (interpreting title VII in light of equal protection jurisprudence and ignoring
legislative intent); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 147-56 (1965) (no discussion of
legislative intent).
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range from questionable2 5 l to untenable.2 5 2 Furthermore, many of the
decisions explicitly rely upon political developments after the statute's
enactment.25 3
I am hardly the first to suggest that the Court is a political actor, for
the legal realists long ago demonstrated that the Court's decisions do not
necessarily flow from principled rules and that the Court decides cases
based in part upon its own preferences. A fair amount of recent legal
scholarship has demonstrated that many of the Court's decisions repre-
sent no consistent effort to replicate the original intent of the enacting
Congress. 254 And there is a rich tradition of positive political theory that
successfully explains outcomes from models that treat the Court as a
political actor not much different from agencies, the President, and
Congress.2 5
My historical account through the lens of a positive political theory
model is further evidence that the Court does not faithfully follow the
251. Compare Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1986) (majority opinion)
(title VII provision making the United States liable "the same as a private person" waives the
government's immunity from attorney's fees, but not interest, because neither the statute, nor the
legislative history specifically mention "interest") with id. at 325-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(preclusion of interest inconsistent with actual congressional expectations). Compare Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1006-13 (1984) (majority opinion's use of legislative intent) with id. at 1026-
31 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (persuasive rebuttal based on underlying congressional assumptions).
Compare United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 199-202 (1977) (majority opinion's
interpretation of legislative history) with id. at 210-16 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (detailed rebuttal).
Compare Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-37 (1968) (majority opinion's detailed
examination of legislative history) with id. at 450-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (even more detailed
rebuttal).
252. A striking example is Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). In Grove City, a
unanimous Court relied on legislative history to conclude that student receipt of federal financial aid
triggers title IX's application to the college. Id at 565-70. A majority then summarily rejected
compelling legislative history which indicated that title IX was intended to cover a whole college.
Compare id at 570-71 (majority opinion) with id. at 582-99 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See also B. Marks, supra note 195 (original legislative history); id. at 71-78
(subsequent legislative history). Compare also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434-36
(1971) (unanimous Court's use of legislative intent in title VII) with H. GRAHAM, supra note 22
(Court's use of legislative intent in Griggs is spurious).
253. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 180-82 (interpreting section 1981 narrowly so as not "to
circumvent the detailed remedial scheme constructed" in [the later] title VII); Atascadero, 473 U.S.
at 237-47 (relying on post-EHA eleventh amendment jurisprudence to interpret statute); Bolden, 446
U.S. at 60-74 (relying on post-Voting Rights Act fifteenth amendment jurisprudence to interpret
statute); Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133-40 (relying on post-title VII fourteenth amendment sex
discrimination jurisprudence to interpret title VII).
254. Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv.
321, 325-32 (1990); Farber, supra note 20; Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and
the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1142-203 (1990) (careful
demonstration of how the Court has ignored or abused legislative history in interpreting federal
Indian law); Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEo. L.J. 353 (1989).
255. See C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948); D. RHODE & H. SPAETH, SUPREME
COURT DECISION MAKING (1976); G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND
IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963 (1965); Segal & Cover, supra note 61.
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traditional approach to statutory interpretation. This positive account
also makes an interesting affirmative point: The Court is often attentive
to the current Congress' preferences when it interprets statutes; there-
fore, these interpretations can then be interpreted as political efforts by
the Court to accommodate its views to those of Congress, or to persuade
Congress to change its views.
If the Court is--consciously or unconsciously-engaging in this sort
of game with Congress, there are interesting normative ramifications. I
explore three of them here: first, a reevaluation of traditional doctrines
relating to the Court's interpretation of statutes; second, a rethinking of
the meaning of judicial activism; and third, a reevaluation of the Court's
role in civil rights policy.
A. Rethinking Specific Doctrines
Most traditional doctrines of statutory interpretation are, at least
rhetorically, grounded upon original intent theory. Consequently, the
Court's political role in the evolution of the nation's civil rights policy
suggests that some of these doctrines should be reconsidered, at least in
the context of implementing civil rights statutes. I shall examine three
such doctrines here-the retroactivity of judicial decisions, the rule
against using subsequent legislative history, and various legislative inac-
tion rules.
1. Retroactivity of Supreme Court Interpretations of Civil Rights
Statutes
The traditional, but not iron-clad, rule has been that legislation only
applies prospectively, whereas judicial interpretation of legislation
applies retroactively.256 Sometimes when the Supreme Court overrules
prior decisions (especially constitutional decisions), it will give the new
rule only prospective effect.257 Sometimes Congress will give retroactive
effect to statutory changes it makes in the law.2"' But when the Court is
merely interpreting statutes and not explicitly overruling prior interpre-
tations, it almost always gives its decisions retroactive effect. So, too,
Congress has traditionally overridden the Court's interpretations by leg-
islating only prospectively.
This dichotomy is based on the traditional view of the different roles
of Court and Congress. Since the Court "declares" the preexisting law,
its decisions apply not only to the case or controversy at hand, but also to
all others pending. Since Congress "creates" new law through the polit-
256. See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 264-77 (1987) (exploring the traditional view and some critiques of it).
257. See id. at 264-70.
258. Id. at 274-77.
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ical process, it would be unfair to apply its "new" rules to preexisting
transactions. The legal realists' demonstration that courts create law in
some of the same ways that legislatures do has discredited this traditional
rationale.25 9 Yet a study of our present practices reveals how strongly
the old dichotomy lives on. For example, even the very liberal House
Education and Labor Committee came close to removing the retroactiv-
ity provisions of the omnibus 1990 bill, based upon these traditional
arguments.26 °
This historical study also suggests a strong reason for why the Court
and Congress should abandon the dichotomy in many cases. On the one
hand, Congress should feel little reluctance to override judicial misinter-
pretations retroactively. Congress did this in the 1986 HCPA and tried
to do so in the 1990 Civil Rights Act. The imperative towards retroactiv-
ity is greater when good evidence exists that the Court's interpretation
alters "settled" expectations, as it did in Jones v. Mayer, Gilbert,
McMann, Bolden, Grove City, Robinson, Atascadero, Betts, Martin v.
Wilks, Wards Cove, and several of the other 1989 decisions. Indeed,
when the Court's interpretation changes a settled agency and lower court
consensus and Congress overrides the Court's novel interpretation,
Congress ought topresume in favor of some form of retroactivity. On the
other hand, the Court should reconsider its policy of retroactive applica-
tion for decisions that in reality represent shifts of law. In such cases, it
makes sense for the Court to give its decisions "prospective-prospective"
effect; that is, the Court's interpretation should apply a year or two years
from the date of the decision, so that Congress can respond to the
Court's new information. 61
2. Subsequent Legislative History
The traditional (original intent) theory suggests that the Court
should not consider subsequent legislative history when interpreting stat-
259. See, eg., Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility,
28 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 534-42 (1977).
260. Representative Moorehead's (R-Cal.) motion to strike the retroactivity provisions passed
by an 18-17 vote. Suddenly, another Democrat on the committee popped up (probably dragged from
some other meeting) to vote with the chair and kill the motion on an 18-18 tie. It is interesting that
this was the only significant Republican motion to come anywhere close to adoption by the liberal
committee. See Marked Transcript of the House Education and Labor Committee (available from
the Committee only).
261. This is hardly a novel strategy. State courts sometimes do this in seeking to call legislative
attention to a problem. See, eg., Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118
N.W.2d 795 (1962) (prospectively overruling the doctrine of sovereign immunity for Minnesota
school districts with respect to torts committed after the adjournment of the following regular
session of the Minnesota Legislature). The Supreme Court used the same strategy in Northern
Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (prospective overruling only of an
unconstitutional provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978). See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982), for an excellent analysis of this concept.
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utes. Indeed, the Burger Court in 1980 invoked "the oft-repeated warn-
ing that 'the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for
inferring the intent of an earlier one.' ,262 The Court, also in 1980, said
that although arguments based on subsequent legislative history "must
be weighed with extreme care, they should not be rejected out of hand as
a source that a court may consider in the search for legislative intent. 263
And in yet a third 1980 case, the Court said that, "while the views of a
subsequent Congress cannot override the unmistakable intent of the
enacting one,... such views are entitled to significant weight ... and
particularly so when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is
obscure."2"
Obviously, the Burger Court had no hard-and-fast rule concerning
subsequent legislative history. The positive political theory model devel-
oped in this Article would predict that the Court would be more likely to
emphasize subsequent legislative history when it is trying to accommo-
date its preferences to those of Congress. Moreover, there is some evi-
dence that the Court does exactly that. In North Haven Board of
Education v. Bell,265 for example, the Court liberally interpreted title IX
to include employment discrimination. We could plausibly conclude
that this interpretation reflected the Court's deference to a strong major-
ity view in Congress to that effect. In fact, the Court's opinion empha-
sized subsequent legislative history.266 Quoting another title IX case in
which the Court bent its preferences toward those of the congressional
median, the Court in North Haven said: "Although postenactment
developments cannot be accorded 'the weight of contemporary legislative
history, we would be remiss if we ignored these authoritative expressions
concerning the scope and purpose of Title IX .... , "267 The Court then
reluctantly interpreted title IX to grant a private right of action. Two
years later, the Court in Grove City relied on subsequent legislative his-
tory to reject the college's argument that federal financial aid to its stu-
dents did not bring the college into title IX's ambit,268 but then
essentially ignored similarly informative subsequent legislative history
cutting against its holding that only the college's financial aid operations
(and not the entire college) fell within title IX. 26 9
262. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980) (quoting
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).
263. Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980).
264. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) (citations omitted).
265. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
266. Id. at 531-35 (HEW regulations considered by Congress and not overruled; indeed,
proposals to change the regulations were defeated).
267. Id. at 535 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 687 n.7 (1979)).
268. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 568-70 & 568 n.19 (1984).
269. Id. at 572-75; cf id. at 592-99 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(detailed examination of subsequent legislative history bearing on this issue).
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The Rehnquist Court's move to the right and its unwillingness to
bend its interpretations to current congressional preferences are mirrored
in its much more consistent rhetoric against the use of subsequent legisla-
tive history. In Betts, for example, the Court marginalized Congress'
1978 overruling of McMann and stated: "We have observed on more
than one occasion that the interpretation given by one Congress (or a
committee or member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance
in discerning the meaning of that statute. '270 The Rehnquist Court con-
sistently inveighs against the use of subsequent legislative history,271
though it has not hesitated to use subsequent statutes to inform its inter-
pretations. 2  Indeed, the Rehnquist Court's refusal to acknowledge
recent legislative expressions of preference is probably loosely correlated
to the Court's provocatively conservative interpretations of civil rights
laws.
Generally, the analysis in this Article suggests a normative justifica-
tion for the Burger Court's practice of softening its conservative prefer-
ences as it looked to subsequent legislative history. The use of
subsequent history may seem inconsistent with original intent theories of
statutory interpretation; however, the practice of the Warren, Burger,
and Rehnquist Courts has borne little resemblance to an original intent
approach in civil rights cases. To the extent that the Court is a political
actor in civil rights cases and is making public policy, it ought to con-
sider current legislative views both to inform its own policy choices and
to avoid an unnecessary legislative overruling. The analysis also suggests
a normative problem with the Rehnquist Court's refusal to credit subse-
quent legislative history: that refusal has deprived the Court of useful
political information and has contributed to confrontations with
Congress.
Some current Justices may believe that it is healthy for the Court to
prod Congress, rather than for the Court to update civil rights statutes
(which they believe their conservative decisions do not). If that is the
270. Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854, 2861 (1989).
271. See, eg., United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 609-10 (1989) (disregarding
postenactment statements of several legislators); Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., 486
U.S. 825, 839-40 (1988) (subsequent legislative history, absent an amendment to the original
language of the statute, should not direct resolution of a case); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake
Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 63 n.4 (1987) ("The conclusions of the 99th Congress, however, are hardly
probative of the intent of the 92d Congress.").
272. E.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 711-31 (1989) (interpreting the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1871); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 181 (1989) ("We should be reluctant ... to read an earlier statute broadly where the result
is to circumvent the detailed remedial scheme constructed in a later statute."); United States v.
Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) ("[R]econciling many laws enacted over time, and getting them to
'make sense' in combination, necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by
the implications of a later statute.").
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Justices' belief, the analysis in this Article carries with it a normative
doctrinal suggestion: The Justices should at least consult subsequent leg-
islative history and other recent materials before deciding whether to
give their conservative decisions prospective-prospective effect. In sum,
if the Court wants Congress to take responsibility for updating civil
rights statutes, it should provide a clear signal to that effect by making its
own decisions prospective (especially when they change previously set-
tled understandings).
3. Legislative Inaction
The Court in general, and even the Rehnquist Court, has relied on
one type of subsequent legislative history: "legislative inaction," namely,
the failure of Congress to overrule Supreme Court decisions, lower court
consensus, and/or agency regulations.273 The analysis in this Article
suggests that the Court's reliance on legislative inaction is most produc-
tive when it sheds light on current legislative preferences (as to either the
congressional median or the veto median). To the extent this suggestion
is correct, the Court ought to be more critical than it has been in the past.
The most questionable of the legislative inaction doctrines is the
acquiescence rule, in which the Court follows a precedent or agency rule
on the basis that Congress never overruled it. For example, in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency,274 the Court reaffirmed Weber based upon
Congress' failure to overrule it and the mistaken belief that there had
been no attempt to do so.275 In reality, the failure of Congress to act
against Supreme Court precedents says very little about the preferences
of the congressional median. For the gatekeepers may favor the decision
and, as a consequence, may not introduce or may at least block overrul-
ing legislation. The gatekeepers, however, may have preferences different
from those of the chamber median; therefore, the failure to act may be
attributed to gatekeeper preference rather than the preference of
Congress as a whole. This may have been the case with Weber.276
273. See Eskridge, supra note 213 (analyzing the Court's recent treatment of legislative
inaction); Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture Into
"Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U.L. REv. 737 (1985) (critically noting the Court's increased reliance
on congressional silence or inaction as an aid to statutory construction).
274. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
275. Id. at 629 n.7. The Court was wrong in thinking that no bill had even been introduced to
overrule Weber, since that was the purpose ofS.J. Res. 41, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and was the
basis for Senate hearings. See Affirmative Action and Equal Protection: Hearings on SJ. Res. 41
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
276. There was no effort made to overrule Weber in 1979-80, for obvious reasons. Any bill to
overrule Weber in the House would have gone to an immediate graveyard in either the Judiciary or
Education and Labor Committee, both of which were probably to the left of the House on this issue.
In the Senate, the chairs of the Judiciary and Labor Committees (Senators Kennedy and Williams,
respectively) would have killed any such bill in 1979-80. The situation changed in the Senate when
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The reenactment rule is somewhat less questionable. Under this
rule, the Court finds support for following a precedent or agency decision
because Congress had reenacted the statute without overruling the deci-
sion. This rule is less questionable because the gatekeepers are not able
to prevent Congress itself from considering amendments to the new stat-
ute (as they often can when there is no action altogether under the acqui-
escence rule). Thus, Congress' failure to overrule Griggs in 1972 has
some significance, not just because the gatekeeping committees endorsed
it in their reports,2 7 7 but also because each chamber had an opportunity
to bring the matter up. In fact, the Senate did defeat an amendment
seeking to bar race-conscious relief in title VII that went well beyond
Griggs. 78 On the other hand, the reenactment rule should not apply if
there is no sound reason to believe that Congress was aware of the
Court's decision.
Legislative inaction is most persuasive, and appears most reliable, in
the context of a rejected proposal. Under the rejected proposal rule, the
Court will infer legislative intent from the defeat of a proposal to over-
rule a precedent or agency decision. So long as the rejection occurs on
the floor of a chamber or in conference committee, it often will be reliable
evidence of subsequent legislative preferences. Nevertheless, rejected
proposals should always be approached critically. For example, the
Court in Runyon v. McCrary relied heavily on the Senate's rejection of a
proposal which would have overruled cases applying Jones v. Mayer to
employment discrimination. 79 The Court, however, did not examine
congressional actions in sufficient detail. It failed to note three crucial
aspects: first, that the proposal was not opposed on the ground that any-
one agreed with Jones v. Mayer; second, that the proposal was rejected
on a tie vote; and third, that a majority of the Senators present actually
favored the proposal, which was scuttled by a gatekeepers' gambit.2z 0
While the Senate's action does provide some evidence of median legisla-
the Republicans took control in 1981. Senator Hatch introduced S.J. Res. 41 and held hearings on it
in the Judiciary Subcommittee, which he chaired. See supra note 275. But the committee was
dominated by a pro-civil-rights coalition even during Republican control, see supra note 66, and S.J.
Res. 41 went nowhere.
277. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text; see also 118 CONG. REc. 7166 (1972)
(conference report operated under assumption that "the present case law as developed by the courts
would continue to govern the applicability and construction of title VII").
278. Senator Ervin proposed an amendment to title VII to prohibit government agencies from
requiring employers to adopt goals for the hiring of minorities. See 118 CONG. REc. 1663-64 (1972).
Senator Javits led the opposition, which defended all sorts of remedial practices that addressed
Griggs-like bad numbers. Id. at 1664-76. The Ervin amendment was defeated by a two-to-one vote.
Id. at 1676. See generally H. GRAHAM, supra note 22, at 439-43 (describing the debate between
Ervin and Javits).
279. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 174 n.1l (1976) (relying on the legislative history of the
rejected proposal to legislatively overrule Jones v. Mayer).
280. This story, and more, is told in Eskridge, supra note 213, at 100-03.
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tor preferences in the early 1970s, the Runyon Court overstated its
significance.
B. Rethinking Judicial Activism
The Supreme Court's conduct has confounded traditional legal
thinking about judicial activism.2"' Judicial activism has always been
associated with the Warren Court, for it struck down many statutes to
protect individual rights and interpreted statutes (especially civil rights
statutes) dynamically and liberally. The Burger Court, however, taught
us that a moderate-to-conservative Court too could be activist-it also
struck down numerous statutes and interpreted others just as dynami-
cally as the Warren Court did (albeit in different ways). The Rehnquist
Court is now teaching us that a conservative Court can be activist also in
a different way. The Rehnquist Court is (thus far) not keen on invalidat-
ing legislation on constitutional grounds, but it is more aggressively
activist in the context of statutory interpretation than was either the
Warren or Burger Court.
This Article's positive analysis suggests a new way of thinking about
judicial activism. Consider the following normative framework: The
Court is activist in interpreting civil rights statutes when it emphasizes
dynamic considerations beyond the statutory text and original intent,
because in so doing the Court is going beyond the expectations of the
enacting Congress. This dynamic interpretation can be politically pro-
ductive activism if the Court's interpretation provides useful information
about the statute to Congress or contributes to the statute's goals. The
Court is even more activist if its interpretation emphasizes its own prefer-
ences over those of both the enacting and current Congress. This self-
interested interpretivism tends to be unproductive activism if the Court's
preferences prove to be useless information or prove to thwart the stat-
ute's operation. The Court/Congress/President civil rights game devel-
oped in this Article suggests some interesting hypotheses for the various
periods discussed.
1. The Warren Court: 1962-72
In civil rights decisions, the Warren Court was quite activist, but
perhaps not so activist as lawyers often suppose. Its interpretations of
nineteenth-century civil rights statutes certainly breathed new life into
them. In most cases, the Court was interpreting very generalized statutes
with little relevant legislative history. In addition, its dynamic interpre-
tation reflecting current values strikes me as mild activism.2" 2 The
281. I am using "judicial activism" in its traditional sense, to mean the Court's substituting its
own preferences for those of elected representatives.
282. I am specifically thinking of Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (interpreting
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Court's liberal interpretations of title VII (Griggs) and of the Voting
Rights Act (Allen) went beyond the original legislative expectations, but
it is not clear that they went against those expectations. I would charac-
terize the decisions as only moderately activist.
What is most striking about the Warren Court's dynamic interpreta-
tion of civil rights statutes is how politically productive it was. None of
the decisions was overruled by Congress. Moreover, Guest and
Louisiana, though dynamic interpretations, were codified and elaborated
by Congress in statutes. Allen and Griggs were embraced as building-
block interpretations by the legislature when it considered the voting
rights extension in 1970 and title VII's amendment in 1972. In each
case, the Court reached results that were perceived as just, gave reasons
that made sense, and helped stimulate legislative responses to advance
the statutory goals.
Although the Warren Court was probably to the left of Congress on
most civil rights issues, its opinions proved persuasive and helped the
Presidency move Congress to the left. To the extent that the Court and
Congress worked so productively together (with critical leadership from
the Presidency), the Warren Court's activism can be defended as not
acutely countermajoritarian. It can also be characterized as politically
astute. The Warren Court was in this way a very successful political
actor in the Court/Congress/President civil rights game. This success is
surely related to the substantial political experience of members of the
Warren Court.283
2. The Burger Court: 1972-86
The Burger Court strikes me as more activist than the Warren
Court in construing civil rights statutes. So far as I can tell, the Burger
Court was no more faithful to original legislative intent than the Warren
Court had been. Runyon, Weber, and Bob Jones were at least as dynamic
on the liberal side as any of the Warren Court's decisions; Gilbert,
McMann, Bolden, Grove City, Robinson, and Atascadero were equally
42 U.S.C. § 1971) and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 241 as a
valid remedy for conspiracies to deprive individuals of their fourteenth amendment rights). The
most controversial decision, Jones v. Mayer, strikes me as inconsistent with original legislative intent.
My conclusion, however, is not so firm in light of recent historiography supporting the Court's
interpretation. See Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope
of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 546 n.36 (1989) (surveying the historiography).
283. The Justices on the 1960s Warren Court were unusually experienced in the political arena.
The "Super Chief" himself had been Governor of California for ten years and also the GOP's vice-
presidential candidate in 1948. Others with substantial political experience were Justices Black
(Senator from Alabama), Douglas (SEC Chair), Clark (Attorney General), Stewart (Mayor of
Cincinnati), White (Deputy Attorney General), Goldberg (AFL-CIO Counsel, Secretary of Labor),
and Fortas (presidential advisor). Justice Brennan, of course, proved the most politically savvy of all,
although he never held elected or national political office.
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dynamic on the conservative side. None of these decisions is easily
defensible as an exercise in discerning the original legislative intent, and,
for the last six, the testimony of Members of Congress involved in the
original legislation provides additional evidence that in any event the
Court was not seriously trying to implement the original legislative
intent. Indeed, Gilbert, Bolden, and Atascadero were apparent efforts by
the Court to transplant its conservative constitutional jurisprudence into
statutory cases.284 Unlike the Warren Court, whose statutory decisions
tended to go "beyond" original legislative expectations, the Burger
Court's civil rights decisions often went "against" original legislative
expectations: They undermined the efficiency of the statutory schemes
they interpreted. Acting against the original intent is arguably more
activist than going beyond original intent, because it actually substitutes
the Court's preferences for those of the legislature.8 5
The Burger Court's activism was often politically unproductive, for
two reasons: its opinions failed to reflect current legislative preferences
any better than historical ones; and the opinions contained unpersuasive
reasoning. The Court's view of pregnancy discrimination in Gilbert-
that it is not gender discrimination because it divides the world into one
group consisting of pregnant women and another group consisting of
men and women who are not pregnant-is bizarre. Not even employer
groups bothered to defend it in the hearings on overruling Gilbert. In
Bolden, the Court's failure even to come up with a position five Justices
could accept, and the harsh approach of the plurality, created confusion
and bewilderment in the voting rights area, one where the Court had
traditionally been a productive leader. The Court's expansive view of
state immunity in Atascadero can be defended as an effort to force
Congress to deliberate more carefully before it abrogates state immunity.
But the legislative overruling of Atascadero was so swift and perfunctory
(there were no hearings) as to raise questions about whether it had a
point at all.
Even though other Burger Court decisions were more productive,2 86
the Burger Court did suffer several overrulings at the hands of an out-
raged Congress. Its statutory opinions were both more activist and less
284. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-47 (1985) (eleventh amendment
jurisprudence critical to Court's new clear statement rule against interpreting statutes to allow
lawsuits against the states); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-74 (1980) (interpreting Voting
Rights Act section 2 in accord with Burger Court fifteenth amendment precedents); General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133-40 (1976) (interpreting title VII in pari materia with fourteenth
amendment).
285. See Farber, supra note 20.
286. See, eg., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1975); Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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politically acceptable than those of the Warren Court. Under the norma-
tive scheme of the positive game, the Burger Court was a much less suc-
cessful player than the Warren Court had been. One reason for the
Burger Court's relatively poor performance is historical misforturie: The
Warren Court may have been more liberal than Congress in the 1960s,
but the direction of Congress' movement was toward the Court, and not
away from it."' The Burger Court, in contrast, moved rightward as
Congress was moving leftward, and so the dynamics of political dis-
course seemed to work against the Court after 1975. Also it appears that
the Burger Court as a group was not quite as politically perceptive as the
Warren Court had been. 88
3. The Rehnquist Court: 1986-Present
Although it is too early to make definite assessments of the
Rehnquist Court's performance in civil rights cases, its decisions to date
indicate that it is more activist than the Burger Court and significantly
more activist than the Warren Court. Consider the controversial cases
from the 1988 Term. None of the opinions even attempted to justify its
results based upon original legislative expectations. 28 9 The outcry in
Congress reinforces the arguments made by dissenting opinions that the
Court followed an interpretive methodology "which is so manipulative as
virtually to invite the charge of result-orientation. '290
It remains to be seen how productive the Rehnquist Court's activ-
ism will be. Betts has already been legislatively overruled. There seems
to be overwhelming bipartisan support for overruling Patterson and
Lorance, and substantial bipartisan support for overruling or modifying
287. The Warren Court was of course lucky to have Presidents sympathetic to its civil rights
agenda, and even luckier to have sympathetic gatekeepers in 1962-72-the Democratic leadership in
both chambers, the House Judiciary Committee, and the Senate Education and Labor Committee.
288. To be sure, the Burger Court Justices were no strangers to the world of Washington
politics. Warren Court holdover Justices Stewart, White, Brennan, and Marshall had sophisticated
political instincts, and Chief Justice Burger had been an Assistant Attorney General. But his
political abilities (building coalitions, leading the Conference, avoiding doomed political battles with
Congress) are widely considered inferior to those of Chief Justice Warren. And among the other
Justices appointed between 1969 and 1983, only Justice Powell had impressive political experience
and instincts.
289. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), never acknowledged that it was implicitly construing
title VII's remedial scheme. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), engaged only
in perfunctory analysis of the statutory text, as did Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts,
109 S. Ct. 2854 (1989). Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), not only ignored
legislative intent, but also selectively relied on subsequent legislative developments. The Patterson
Court interpreted section 1981 narrowly, in part because a broad reading might "circumvent" the
detailed statutory scheme adopted in title VII. Id. at 181. Given the legislative belief after Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), that section 1981 would be an additional remedy in race
discrimination cases, the Court's reliance on title VII seems arbitrary.
290. Betts, 109 S. Ct. at 2870 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Hopkins and Zipes. 29 In addition, there is a good chance that Congress
will modify Wards Cove and Martin v. Wilks, albeit not without consid-
ering the Court's values.
Obviously, the Rehnquist Court was (in 1989 anyway) not a very
successful player of the Court/Congress/President civil rights game.
Like prior Courts, it did not interpret civil rights statutes by trying to
discern original legislative intent; but, unlike the Warren and Burger
Courts, it often missed the tenor of current legislative majorities. I find it
quite puzzling that the Rehnquist Court might be less successful than the
Burger Court. Although the Rehnquist Court is on the whole a sheltered
group with unimpressive political experience, it is not vastly different
from the Burger Court in its personnel. And the Rehnquist Court is
historically lucky (for the time being) to enjoy the support of a President
significantly to the right of Congress. My hypothesis in response to this
puzzle is that the Rehnquist Court may currently be rethinking whether
it wants to play this game, which was played (adroitly) by the Warren
Court and (in a mediocre way) by the Burger Court. Consider the next
Section.
C. The New Textualism and the Future Role of the Court in
National Civil Rights Policy
The Rehnquist Court surely does not see itself as unusually activist
and politically unpredictive. Some of the Justices on the Court (foremost
among them Justice Scalia) have responded to these criticisms essentially
by denying the legitimacy of the Court/Congress/President civil rights
game that the Court has played for decades. According to the "new tex-
tualists" like Justice Scalia, the Court's role is not to implement the pref-
erences of either the enacting or the current legislature, but to apply the
"plain meaning" of the statutory text as passed by both chambers of
Congress and presented to the President.2 92 The new textualism posits
that truly "neutral" statutory interpretation does not consider the "sub-
jective" preferences of Congress, only the "objective" meaning of a stat-
291. See 1990 Senate CivilRights Hearings, supra note 171, at 5-6 (statement of Sen. Hatch), 71-
72 (statement of Prof. Fried), 111 (statement of Deputy Attorney General Ayer).
292. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (hearings on new textualism); Eskridge, The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (discussing, inter alia, how the new textualism of Justice
Scalia posits a radically different role for the Court); Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989
U. ILL. L. REv. 399 (demonstrating how textualism and deference to administrative expertise
currently favor the policies of a Republican administration over the policies of a Democratic
Congress); Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding
Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295 (1990) (criticizing the new textualism as
insufficiently deferential to legislative preferences and proposing that such preferences be analyzed as
judicially noticed "facts").
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ute's words. If the plain meaning of the words runs counter to current
legislative preferences, textualism's adherents reason, Congress can
always amend the statute. New textualists believe it is better (and indeed
constitutionally required) for Congress to do the amending than for the
Court to do so through "interpretation."
The new textualism is an ideologically significant development. By
excluding evidence of actual legislative expectations (past or present), the
new textualism signals that the Court may no longer be willing to play
the positive game, and that it is willing to tolerate tension between itself
and Congress. Elsewhere, I have criticized the new textualism for failing
to provide a persuasive justification for its rethinking of the Court's
role. 93 I only want to suggest three points here. First, as it has actually
operated in civil rights cases, the textual analysis engaged in by the right
wing of the Rehnquist Court has not established its claims to objectivity.
Second, textualism is an inappropriate way for the Court to fulfill its
inherently subordinate role in statutory policymaking. And third, if the
Court's embrace of the new textualism continues to move its decisions
further from current legislative preferences, Congress might consider
removing or diminishing the Court's role in civil rights statutory
interpretation.
L The New Textualism's Questionable Claim to Objectivity
A problem with textualism is that words do not interpret them-
selves, and the general and norm-filled language often favored by statu-
tory drafters offers a variety of interpretive choices. How the statutory
interpreter makes those choices depends heavily on her own perspective
and often on her own preferences. The new textualists' claim that they
can divine universal, objective meaning from such language is therefore
suspect. Their performance in recent civil rights cases bears out this
insight.
Recall Patterson, where the five-Justice majority held that the racial
harassment Brenda Patterson endured at the hands of her employer did
not violate section 1981's right "to make and enforce contracts" irrespec-
tive of race. The Court's only rationale was that protecting Brenda
Patterson's right to "make" a contract "extends only to the formation of
a contract, but not to problems that may arise later from the conditions
of continuing employment," '294 and that protecting Patterson's right to
"enforce" the contract only "prohibits discrimination that infects the
legal process in ways that prevent one from enforcing contract rights."'2 95
The Court cited no precedent or other authority to support its narrow
293. See Eskridge, supra note 292, at 669-78.
294. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989).
295. Id. at 177.
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interpretation of section 1981. Certainly, ordinary usage of the words
"make" and "enforce" does not compel such a narrow reading. To say,
as the Court did, that a broad statutory protection of a person's right "to
make and enforce contracts" only applies to the original formation and
to the legal process of contract enforcement is like saying that a sandwich
consists only of two pieces of bread (and not the meat in the middle). To
say that Brenda Patterson has "the same ight... to make.., contracts
... as is enjoyed by white citizens" surely implies a right to nondiscrimi-
natory terms throughout the duration of the employment contract, as a
matter of plain meaning. To say that she has "the same right.., to
enforce.., contracts.., as is enjoyed by white citizens" explicitly pro-
tects her right to "give effect to" (the dictionary meaning of "enforce") a
nondiscriminatory contract. This is all Brenda Patterson was claiming.
Her interpretation of the plain meaning of section 1981 strikes me as
more objective than that of the Court. Indeed, her reading is precisely
the one that congressional critics of Jones v. Mayer felt was the plain
meaning of the statute (and the reason they wanted it changed).296
Moreover, there is no persuasive reason to protect against racial dis-
cimination in the acts of entering into a contract and suing upon a con-
tract, without including the acts of performing the contract. Recall the
facts of Runyon, which Patterson purported to reaffirm. In Runyon, the
Court held that private segregated schools could not refuse to admit ("to
make a contract" with) the parents of black children, under the plain
meaning of section 1981. By implication, Runyon surely interprets sec-
tion 1981 to prevent a school from admitting black children and then
expelling them because of their race. It is virtually certain that the Court
would have found that such expulsion would impair the children's ability
to "enforce"-give effect to-their contracts. Yet Patterson disallows
this interpretation. Hence, Patterson is internally incoherent: It explic-
itly reaffirms Runyon while simultaneously repudiating by implication a
necessary part of Runyon's holding.
In Patterson, the new textualists do not even present plausible tex-
tual arguments for their position. The case exemplifies their most naked
activism, namely, their willingness to read a statute narrowly (contrary
to its apparent textual meaning and precedent) based upon nothing more
than their own policy preferences. Patterson, of course, may not repre-
sent the new textualist ideology at its best. Usually, the new textualists
have more plausible semantic arguments about the meaning of specific
296. In the debates on the 1972 amendments to title VII, Senator Hruska complained that
unless his amendment were adopted to make title VII the exclusive remedy for job discrimination, "a
black female employee [claiming] a denial of either a promotion or a pay raise ... because of her
color" could bypass title VII by filing "a complaint in Federal court under the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866." 118 CONG. REC. 3368-69 (1972). Brenda Patterson was a "black female
employee [claiming] a denial of... a promotion ... because of her color."
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words, phrases, or sentences.2 9 7 Even when well articulated, however,
their semantic arguments are more suggestive than conclusive and do not
exclude other "textual" readings. Because the Patterson Court did not
even bother to clothe its decision in plausible textualist arguments, its
(anti-civil-rights) result orientation is manifest. Thus far in civil rights
cases, I find little (or in Patterson, nothing) objective about the new tex-
tualists' results or reasoning. That the new textualists' semantic argu-
ments so often seem to favor defendants in civil rights cases further
undermines the theory's claim to objectivity and neutrality. 298
2. False Modesty of the New Textualism
Our system of government still assumes that the Court is a
subordinate player in statutory policymaking, and at least some of the
new textualists continue to argue that the Court is the "honest agent" of
Congress.2 9 9 If this is so, the new textualism is not a very helpful
approach to statutory interpretation.3" An honest agent does not con-
sider himself bound by the narrowest, most literal meaning of the princi-
pal's commands, but instead seeks to carry out her commands in the
context of the principal's original expectations, original goals, and even
current expectations and goals-all as they relate to the situation at
hand. An agent is neither competent nor faithful if he interprets the
principal's command without really trying to move the enterprise for-
ward. Thus, if the principal instructs the agent to make and enforce con-
tracts for her (the Patterson situation), doesn't the agent know that he
should monitor performance of the contracts? It is a pretty lame agent
who sees monkey business going on in the operation of the contract and
shrugs, "Well, that's too bad for the principal, but my orders were just to
'make and enforce' contracts, and I think they are pretty narrow
commands."
In the context of this Article's game-theoretic analysis, the new tex-
tualists would respond that the best course for the agent is to consult the
297. For narrowly literalist analysis by the new textualists in civil rights cases, see Public
Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854, 2861-64 (1989) (Kennedy, J., for the Court)
(interpreting term "subterfuge" according to "ordinary meaning" rather than considering legislative
and statutory context); Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758-61
(1989) (Scalia, J., for the Court) (rewriting title VII fee-shifting provision without reference to
legislative intent); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 279 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(interpretation of "because of"); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 669-77 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's approach to statutory interpretation).
298. See Ross, supra note 292 (arguing that the new textualists' methodology systematically
favors conservative values).
299. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 60 (1984).
300. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 291-93 (1985) (criticizing
stingy textualist interpretation as not very helpful to legislative process).
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principal when there is ambiguity in the directive. °1 Stringent textual
interpretations of civil rights statutes that trigger legislative overrides can
be useful, according to this ideology, insofar as they encourage clarifica-
tion from the most legitimate party, the principal. What this response
ignores is that overrides are costly. When the agent fails to monitor the
contract's operation, those contract losses are lost to the principal even if
she is able to correct the agent's misinterpretation later. And the whole
point of having a sophisticated agent is that he will "act for" the princi-
pal, without having to bother the principal constantly with the details of
implementation.
Similarly, a Court that distorts the congressional civil rights policy
and thereby triggers legislative overrides is usually behaving in a
countermajoritarian way. It takes time for Congress to override the
Court's errant interpretations, and during that time, victims of discrimi-
nation are denied the remedies that Congress has established and, indeed,
wants them to have. Sometimes, Congress will not override decisions it
disagrees with, either because well-placed opposition (Senate filibuster, a
hostile gatekeeping committee in either chamber, or a presidential veto)
makes enactment unlikely or because the legislative agenda is already
full. As the experiences in 1988 and 1990 have shown us, overriding the
Court's statutory civil rights decisions is a mine field and usually requires
substantial effort that would be better spent correcting new problems, not
reiterating agreed-upon solutions to old ones. This is the most serious
indictment of the Rehnquist Court's activism: by clogging the legislative
agenda with issues settled yesterday, the Court is distracting Congress
from understanding and addressing the tough civil rights issues of today
and tomorrow.
3. Shifting Responsibility for Civil Rights Interpretation
Away From the Court
The most important implication of our game-theoretic model is that
if the Court is reluctant or obstructive in its implementation of congres-
sional civil rights policy, Congress should consider establishing proce-
dural rules to limit the Court's role. An important theme of positive
political theory is that Congress can exercise control over its "agents" in
how it structures "agency" procedures. 302 Because the Court is harder
to discipline than executive departments or independent commissions,
301. The new textualists are not wont to find much ambiguity, however. See Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (indicating a propensity
to find unambiguous statutory meaning).
302. Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL.
Sm. REv. 1094 (1985); Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
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this strategy might not work as well-and indeed it might clash with the
checks and balances function of an independent judiciary-but several
proposals bear consideration.
Probably the least useful is the rule, floated in the vetoed 1990 bill
and in the proposed 1991 bill, directing the Court to interpret civil rights
statutes "broadly" and to reflect legislative "intent."30 3 Apart from the
constitutional problems with such a rule,"° it is hard for me to see how it
would make much difference. Justice Kennedy, the author of Patterson,
probably thought he was construing section 1981 broadly and consist-
ently with the legislative intent (as he read it in the plain meaning of the
statute's text). Should any of the cases mentioned in this Article be
reconsidered under the broad construction rule, at least one-Weber-
would probably be decided differently. Weber, after all, was a "narrow"
interpretation of title VII's prohibition of discrimination, which is hard
to square with original legislative "intent." (That would probably sur-
prise the sponsors of the 1990 and 1991 bills!) In any event, this sort of
interpretational "rule" would probably not make the Court a more coop-
erative player in the game outlined in this Article.
Rather than legislating such a general rule, Congress should con-
sider more structural rules for civil rights cases. For example, Congress
might be more specific about information it wants the Court to consider.
An interpretation statute might require the Court to consider committee
reports when construing civil rights statutes, to solicit amicus curiae
briefs from designated public interest groups and the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission, and to solicit information on the effect of the proposed
interpretations on the ability of victims of discrimination to obtain effec-
tive redress. The difference between this sort of interpretation statute
and the one contained in the 1990 and 1991 bills is that it not only gives a
strong signal to the Court (as the current bills do), but also invites or
requires the Court to become better informed about American civil rights
policy. Information theory suggests (persuasively, to me) that con-
fronting information itself can shift preferences in at least some cases.
Along precisely these lines is the suggestion that Congress shift
responsibility for interpreting civil rights statutes from article III courts
to one or more administrative agencies. There are several ways Congress
can try to do this. The most logical approach would be to vest one or
303. As finally passed (and vetoed), the 1990 bill provided in section 1107(a): "All Federal laws
protecting the civil rights of persons shall be interpreted consistent with the intent of such laws, and
shall be broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of such laws to provide effective... remedies."
136 CONG. REC. H9554 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990) (emphasis added). This language has been carried
over in H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1107 (1991).
304. That is, it might be argued (though I am not persuaded) that such a rule represents a
legislative usurpation of article III judicial functions. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 262 (1975).
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more existing agencies (such as the EEOC) with formal rulemaking
authority and legislate a very restrictive standard for judicial review.
This approach has the advantage of building upon the Court's own pre-
cept of deferring to administrative interpretation of regulatory stat-
utes.3 °5 The Court has tended to ignore that precept when agencies
charged with enforcing civil rights laws try to help victims of discrimina-
tion (usually the Court relies upon the pretext that Congress did not give
the agency "formal" rulemaking authority).30 6 Giving agencies formal
rulemaking authority would shift the responsibility for fleshing out and
updating civil rights laws from an increasingly conservative Court to
agencies that might better reflect and respond to congressional
preferences.
This strategy, of course, will not guarantee that civil rights policy
will be set at the congressional median (M). A conservative President
can use his executive authority or his appointment and OMB review
authority to press any agency to the right of the congressional median.
The President can then use the veto threat to protect the agency from
being overruled. Hence, policy might end up closer to the veto median
(V) than to Congress' preferred point (M).
This scenario, however, is hardly inevitable. First, Congress can
build a pro-civil-rights bias into the procedures the agency must follow to
make policy and conduct adjudications. For instance, Congress might
require the agency to consider the views of specified groups in the civil
rights community. Or it might provide funding for reports on the impact
of proposed rules on discrimination victims and on their access to justice.
It might also allocate decisionmaking responsibility among long-term
civil service personnel (such as administrative law judges) as well as
political appointees. Second, Congress has more leverage over an agency
than it has over the Court. Through oversight hearings, appropriations
bills, and informal means of communication, Congress can influence
agency policy to shift in the direction of congressional preferences.
Moreover, in a decade during which the Court's preferences con-
cerning civil rights will surely lie significantly to the right of Congress'
preferences, Congress may be better off with agency-driven policy even if
the agency follows presidential, rather than congressional, direction. An
agency that is controlled by a conservative Presidency and which sets
305. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(deferring to EPA's construction of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, when Congress had not
directly addressed the question at issue); see Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 552 (1985) (arguing from a utilitarian perspective that courts "should
presumptively defer to agency interpretations of statutes in situations where Congress has endowed
the agency with significant policymaking responsibility").
306. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (refusing to defer to EEOC on
pregnancy issue).
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policy at the veto median (V) is preferable to a Court that sets policy to
the right of the veto median (V). In other words, Congress prefers an
interpreter that will play the Court/Congress/President civil rights game
(an agency) to one that refuses to play it (the Court in 1989) or plays it
badly (the Court in Gilbert or Grove City). Congress' agenda is simply
too crowded to permit the repeated overruling of judicial interpretations
of civil rights statutes. In addition, Congress can work more produc-
tively with an agency, which is well-informed about legislative prefer-
ences and the dynamics of civil rights, than with a Court that has
demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to be cooperative. On the
other hand, under a moderate or liberal Presidency, agency policymaking
would quickly shift toward the congressional median (M), whereas a
shift in the Court's preferences would probably take years and require
appointments by a series of moderate or liberal Presidents as space on the
Court becomes available.
CONCLUSION: RENEGING ON HISTORY?
Contrary to some statements made in the congressional debates in
1990, the Court's 1989 civil rights decisions have a certain continuity
with what came before. The Court in Patterson and the other 1989 deci-
sions was not faithfully seeking original legislative intent or neutrally
applying the statutes' plain meaning. But, then, the Court has never
acted that way in civil rights statutory interpretation. This sort of judi-
cial activism in statutory interpretation is nothing new.
The Court that decided Patterson and the other 1989 decisions was
producing results that did not reflect current legislative preferences.
However, this was also true of the Warren Court (which thrived on such
independence and never got overruled) and was often true of the Burger
Court (which in almost every instance was promptly overruled). There-
fore, again, ignoring current legislative preferences is nothing new.
Finally, the Rehnquist Court approached Patterson and the other 1989
decisions from a perspective substantially more conservative than that of
Congress. But that has been true of the Court since 1972, when Justices
Rehnquist and Powell started voting.
Despite these points of continuity, there remains a deep sense of
rupture, a dramatic unsettling of things in our political system, because
of the 1989 civil rights decisions. The game-theory model of the Court/
Congress/President dynamics in statutory interpretation is a formal (and
of course incomplete) way of expressing this rupture. The big change in
1989 was the Court's seeming unwillingness, in a series of high-visibility
cases, to play the game. In the short term, the Court's "attitude" has
produced an intense political conflict involving all three branches of gov-
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emnment. In the long term, I doubt the Court will sustain its uncoopera-
tive attitude, because the game is important to the Court as well.
The 1989 rupture ought to awaken the civil rights community to the
fact that the Supreme Court is no longer the most appropriate mecha-
nism for advancing progressive civil rights policies through statutory
interpretation. This has been true for some time. The 1989 decisions
dramatically confirmed exactly how far to the right the Court has
drifted. The challenge for Congress and civil rights groups in the 1990s
is to develop alternative approaches for implementation that do not
depend upon the Court's cooperation. The Court has, as Republican
Senator Jeffords charged, "reneged on history. '3 0 7 Like previous Courts,
the Rehnquist Court has substituted its policy preferences for those of
the enacting Congress. But it has also "reneged" on the historical tradi-
tion by which the Court has long attended to the preferences of
Congress. This is a breach of political faith that underlies the sense of
betrayal felt by Senator Jeffords and others. It remains to be seen
whether that breach of faith will stimulate a larger rethinking of deci-
sionmaking power to implement our nation's civil rights agenda.
307. 136 CONG. REc. S1022 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990).
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